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THE LIFE, AND PHILOSOPHY, OF *EPICTETUS.*

With THE

EMBLEME OF Humane LIFE, By *CEBES.*

Rendred into Engliſh, by
JOHN DAVIES *of* Kidwelly.

LONDON,
Printed by *T. R.* for *John Martyn*, and are to be Sold at the Sign of the *Bell* without *Temple Bar*, 1670.

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TO THE
Right HONOURABLE,
PHILIP HOWARD
OF
NORFOLK,
Lord Almoner *to her moſt Sacred Majeſty of* Great Brittain, *&c.*

TO prove the productions of the *Ancients* extraordinary and tranſcendent in their kinds, it would be hard for me to bring a greater Teſtimony, then the preſent I heer make your Lordſhip of theſe two ſmall, yet Maſter-Pieces of *Morality*. The vene-

ration and esteem wherewith they have been entertain'd through so many Ages sufficiently argue, that Time, with all its envy, hath not been able to make any diminution of their Original excellency.

For, who can reflect on *Epictetus*, without a certain astonishment at his exemplary *Constancy*? Who can think on the strictness of his *Precepts*, without framing to himself an Idæa of that noble *Insensibility*, which the *Stoicks* requir'd in their *Virtuoso*? Who can view him so *indifferent* and *unconcern'd* in the greatest emergencies,

cies, and not be convinc'd, that there may be an undiſtracted purſuit of Vertue through all the diſgraces and inconveniences of humane Life? Who, in fine, ſhall conſider him laying down *Humility* for the Ground-work of his *Morals*, and not be ſurpriz'd at the ſtrange illumination of a *Heathen* Philoſopher?

Theſe, my Lord, were the Characters which endear'd *Epictetus* to all the lovers of vertuous action, and rais'd him out of the miſeries of Servitude into a familiarity with Emperours. From which con-

siderations I must acknowledge my self encourag'd to recommend him, in his present dress, to your Patronage, presuming that, with these Qualifications, he must be kindly receiv'd by a Person, who hath prefer'd the splendor arising from Christian Austerities and Mortifications before all the advantages of Nature or Fortune; and with him the sincerity and submission wherewith I am,

My Lord,

Your most humbly

devoted Servant

J. DAVIES.

THE PREFACE.

TO make some estimate of the value which hath been from time to time set on the Dictates of Epictetus, we may content our selves with this remark, that so many Learned Hands have been employ'd either in the rendring of them into other Languages, or the explication of them in his own. In the Latine, there are many Versions, of all which it is not our design here to give any parti-

particular account. *In* English, *I cannot find that it hath appear'd above once before, done as close as could be to the Original, and as well as the* English *could bear it: which Edition came out about the year* 1610. *entituled,* The Manual of Epictetus.

In the French *Tongue, several eminent Persons spent their pains about it, among whom Monsieur* Boileau *is the last, and consequently the most exact, in regard he had consulted all that had gone before him on this subject. His labours herein prov'd so acceptable, that in few years his Work came to a third Impression, which*

which appearing abroad in the year 1667. *is the Original of this Tranſlation. It ſeems, in the precedent Editions Monſ.* Boileau *had intituled it* The Enchiridion of Epictetus; *but in the laſt, out of complyance with the advice of ſome Friends, and a reflection that ſome Words, as they are not ſo eaſily pronounc'd, ſo are they not ſo eaſily naturaliz'd as others, he put out that Title, and call'd it, the* Philoſophy of Epictetus.

Monſieur Du Vair, *who ſome years ſince tranſlated this Tract, was pleas'd to call it alſo the* Manual of Epictetus. *But our Author*

thor declin'd that name too, partly out of a consideration that the Word Manual seems to be particularly consecrateed to Works of Devotion and Piety, and partly, that Enchiridion is a Greek Term, which, in this place, properly signifies a Ponyard. The reason alledged by Simplicius, why Arrian gave it that Title, is this; That, as Ponyards are light Armes, which we commonly carry about us, to be us'd when we are surpriz'd by our Enemies: So should we always have this little Book before our eyes, that we may the better oppose the assaults of our Passions, a kind of domestick

Enemies,

Enemies, whereof we should be alwaies distrustfull. Had our Author been satisfy'd with this fancy of Simplicius, he would still have entituled his Book, the Ponyard of Epictetus; but somewhat improperly, inasmuch as besides that it might have frighted some Readers, it sounded not well to attribute either defensive or offensive Armes to Epictetus, a Philosopher so signall for his Constancy and Patience. Upon which reflections he thought best to call it simply the Philosophy of Epictetus.

Mons. Boileau affirms further of himself, that, for the better under-

der-

derſtanding of the Original Author, he got all the helps he could out of the Diſcourſes of Arrian *and the* Greek *Commentary of* Simplicius, *an excellent Work, comprehending the whole* Morality *of the* Stoicks. *He ſaies alſo, that, among the many* Latine *Verſions, he kept moſt cloſely to thoſe of* Politian *and* Wolfius, *as the moſt exactly done; not forgetting the late labours of* Salmaſius *upon this Piece, in a large Commentary upon that of* Simplicius.

But what our Authour moſt eſteems in this Work of his, is the Life of Epictetus, *which had*

not

not been written in any Language before, and consequently must require the greater pains, since it was to be collected out of so many several Authors. Had he pleas'd, he might have made it larger; but some things have been omitted, that it might be the more proportion'd to this Abridgment.

At the end of the Philosophy follows Cebes's Tablet, that is, an Embleme, or Representation of Humane Life, before which there is a Preface giving an account of it. These two Pieces have been for the most joyned together,

gether, partly upon a consideration of the allyance of the Subject, and partly upon that of their Antiquity.

J. D.



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

THE LIFE OF EPICTETUS.

EPICTETUS was born neer the end of *Nero's* Empire, at *Hierapolis*, a City of *Phrygia*. Of his birth there is no certaine account, for his Father and Mother are equally unknown. All the certainty we have of him is, that he was a [b] Slave of one, named *Epaphroditus*, a Libertine, and one of the Captains of

Suid. in Epict.

[b] Arrian. Diss. l. 1. c. 9.

[b] Arr. *Diſſ.* *l.* 1. *c.* 9. *Nero's* Life-Guard, a perſon recommendable upon no other ſcore, ſave that of being Maſter to ſo illuſtrious a Slave.

Arrian relates of this *Epaphroditus* two actions, among others, worthy certainly the Genius of the perſon, and which I the rather take notice of here, becauſe, I conceive, they perfectly expreſſe his character. One day, this Man, ſold to another Officer of *Nero's*, one of his Slaves, named *Felicion*, by profeſſion a Shoo-maker, as accounting him no expert Workman. That Slave coming afterwards, by that means, to be the Emperour's Shoo-maker, and *Epaphroditus* hearing of it, treated him with extraordinary civilities and reſpects, and at length made him his greateſt Friend and Confident.

[c] Arrian. *Diſſ.* *l.* 1. *c.* 26. [c] Another time, a certain Man caſting himſelf at his feet, extreamly deploring the croſſneſſe of his Fortune, and complaining, that, of all his eſtate, he had but a hundred and fifty thouſand crowns left, *Epaphroditus* made anſwer, In troth, Friend, I much wonder, that you have had the patience to forbear ſpeaking of it ſo long. Which he ſayd, not by way of ralliery, but very ſeriouſly, and out of a real admiration. It

It was under the verge of this imperious Master that [d] *Epictetus* pass'd away the first years of his life. About what time, or how he obtained his Liberty, is not known; onely this we find, that under the reign of *Domitian*, there being a publick Edict, for the departure of all the Philosophers out of *Rome* and *Italy*, *Epictetus* was oblig'd, among others, to retire to *Nicopolis*, a City of *Epirus*, now called *Preveza*. This is a clear argument, that he had then obtain'd liberty, since he was forc'd, as a *Philosopher*, to leave *Rome*. Nor indeed is it to be imagin'd, that a person of his merit, belov'd and esteem'd by the Emperours of his time, should continue in Slavery.

[d] Aul. Gel. Noct. Att. l. 12. c. 11. Suet. in Domit. Philost. l. 7. Dion. Chrysost. de Exil. Euseb. in Chron.

It is generally beleeved, that after his exile, he never return'd to *Rome*, and that his constant abode was at *Nicopolis*; for *Arrian* affirms, in severall places, that the *Discourses* he collected of his, were held by him at *Nicopolis*. But I question the truth of this conjecture, notwithstanding the Authority of [f] *Salmasius*. For [g] *Spartian* writes, among other things, that the Emperour *Hadrian* entertain'd this Philosopher with much familiarity. Now how that could be, I

[†] l. 2. c. 6.

[f] In Not. ad Epist. & Sim. p. 4.

[g] In Vit. Hadr. p. 8.

cannot imagine, if *Epictetus* continued ſtill at *Nicopolis*. But whether *Epictetus* liv'd in that City or not, is of no great concern to his Life.

Nor do I know whether he were ever married; but as I affirm it not, ſo do I neither deny it. For [h] *Arrian* obſerves that *Epictetus* blam'd the *Epicureans* for their ſpeaking againſt Marriage. But that he was not married, ſeems deducible hence, that though he did not account Marriage imcompatible with vertue, yet he thought it a great obſtacle to the attainment of perfection. But whether he were married or not, it is very likely he had no Children, or at leaſt no Daughters. For beſides that his having any is not mentioned in any Author; [k] *Lucian* relates, that one day *Epictetus* perſwading *Demonax* to take a Wife, *Demonax* jeeringly made anſwer, 'Well, I am content to do it, conditionally you give me one of your Daughters.

Moreover, [l] *Spartian* affirms, that *Hadrian* exercis'd great liberalities and reſpects towards the Poets, Orators, Philoſophers, Mathematicians, and all Profeſſors of Science. But whatever

Spartian

[h] *l.* 3. *c.* 7. *Arr. Diſſ. l.* 3. *c.* 22.

[k] *In Dem.*

[l] *In Vit. Hadr.*

Spartian relates of that Prince, of whom it may be sayd, that never any man took such pleasure in abusing and scoffing at those very persons, as he did; certain it is, that *Epictetus* was always very poor, and that neither the sayd Emperour, nor his Successors, who so highly esteemed him, did advance him much, if at all, in matter of wealth; and possibly this might proceed from his great contempt thereof. For it is granted, he lived at *Rome* in a little house, which had not so much as a door. [m] All the Attendants he had was an old Servant maid, and all his Houshould-stuff, an earthen Lamp, by the light whereof he brought forth those noble and divine reflections; of which we have at this day the remainders in the Books of *Arrian*. Whence it may be guessed how poor he was.

[m] Vincent. Obsop. l. 3. Anth. ad Epig. Epictet.

But to return to his Sentiments and Morality; Modesty was his darling and most familiar Vertue. Hence came it, that he affirmed, 'There was no necessity 'of adorning houses with Tapestry and 'Pictures; but that they were to be fur-'nished with Modesty and Temperance; 'for those were the ornaments that last 'alwaies, and never grow old, or are

Strob. Ser. 38.

"out of fashion. He had so far renounc'd ambition and ostentation, that if ever *Philosopher* did things out of humility, it may be said that he was the person. For as there was not any man, in his time, that did so many good Actions as he; so was there not any that ever made it so much his business to conceal them, and to have it believ'd that he had not done them. Whence it came, that amongst the Instructions he gave his *Disciples*, these were the chiefest:

Exhor. Epict. *If you are so happy as to have learnt to satisfie your body with little, make no ostentation of it. If you have brought your self to a custom of drinking only water, forbear bragging of it. If you have a desire to enter upon some painful exercise, do it privately. Whatever may come of it, do nothing out of a design to be observ'd, or admir'd by the people. All these affectations are vain, and unbecoming a Philosopher.*

And indeed *Epictetus* was at so great a distance from vanity, that though he were the ablest of any of his time, to Write, yet was he never inclin'd to do it; though that be an humour which hath been predominant over the noblest Souls. For if his Disciple *Arrian* had not

not reduc'd to writing, what he had heard him deliver by word of mouth, *Epictetus* would haply have been a name unknown in the world. Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. l. 17. c. 9.

He was of opinion also, that a true Philosopher ought to *do*, and not to *speak*. He accordingly affirm'd, that most of those, who took upon them to be Philosophers, were only such as to the denomination; but not such in effect. One day, a certain person being displeas'd at some others pittying of him; *Friend*, said *Epictetus* to him, *you are much to blame for being so angry. For upon this very account that you are offended at your being bemoan'd, you are deservedly pittied.* Another time, observing a Man who was engag'd in a most infamous Debauch, and careless of all honour and reputation, falling into discourse of Study and Philosophy, he cryed out; *O extravagant man! what dost thou mean to do? Hast thou consider'd whether thy Vessel be pure and clean, before thou pourest any thing into it? For otherwise, whatever thou hast put into it, will be corrupted and turned into Urine or Vineger, or something worse.* Φιλοσόφους ἄνευ τοῦ πράττειν μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν. Arr. Diss. l. 4. c. 5. A. Gell. Noct. Att. l. 17. c. 19.

A. Gellius, who relates this passage, conceives there could not be any thing

more judiciously, or more truly spoken; as if he would insinuate, that when Philosophy, and the other Sciences fall into a sordid soul, defil'd with Vice; they are, as it were, in a foul and unclean Vessel, where they are tainted, and beget nothing but corruption.

Arr. *l.* 4. *Dissert. c.* 12.

But *Epictetus* had a quality, which I esteem the more, in that it is a rare one, even in a Philosopher. He was an extraordinary lover of Neatness; and would say sometimes, that he would rather see one of his Disciples with his hair well comb'd, and in good order, than tangled and nasty. But though he were so great a lover of Neatness, yet was it not ever the more observable in his own person. He was infirm of Body, and lame, by reason of a defluxion fallen down into his leg. He does ingeniously acknowledge as much in an *Epigram* he made of himself, which might be thus rendred;

A Gell. *Noct. Att. l.* 2. *c.* 18.

Δοῦλος Ἐπίκτητος γενόμην καὶ σῶμ' ἀνάπηρος,
Καὶ πενίην Ἶρος καὶ φίλος ἀθανάτοις.

Born,

Born, indispos'd of Body, and a Slave;
Kindness, from Fortune, I could never find;
But this advantage from the Gods I have,
Their unexhausted Treasures fill my Mind.

Planudes, in his Collection of Greek Epigrams, falsly attributes this to *Leonidas*, as *Vincentius Obsopæus* hath well observ'd: and after him, *Salmasius*, who also pretends that this Epigram is not *Epictetus*'s, and that it was added to *A. Gellius* by some *not-deeply-learnt* person. All the reason he gives of it, is, That it is not found in an ancient Manuscript of *Aulus Gellius*'s: I am apt to believe it might be so. But if this conjecture be true; it must be also granted, that the same *not-deeply-learned* person had got it added to *Macrobius*, who cites it, as *Epictetus*'s, in the first Book of his *Saturnalia*, and brings in the same words of *Aulus Gellius*. But indeed the reason, arguing this Epigram not to be *Epictetus*'s, is this, that it cannot easily be presum'd, a Philosopher, so remarkable for his modesty and humility, as he was, should speak so advantageously of his own worth.

In Antholog. *Lib.* 7. *cap.* λγξ.

c. 11.

Howere it might be, this is most certain,

tain, that Fortune had not the leaſt kindneſs for *Epictetus*; yet did not her Perſecutions ever oblige him to make his addreſſes ever the more to Great Perſons. *They are very much to blame,* ſaid he ſometimes, *to pride themſelves in the conceit that ſo many court them with their reſpects and ſervices. Do they imagine, that it is for their own ſakes all theſe ſubmiſſions are made? Every one, as to that particular minds his own concern, which taken away they are ſoon ſlighted. They are juſtly ſerv'd, as Aſſes are: If they be rubb'd or curry'd, it is in order to ſome ſervice to be got out of them. So we reverence thoſe men, as men do the Feaver at* Rome. *If Altars be erected to her, it is out of a fear of the hurt ſhe may do. But what ſo great miſchief,* continu'd he, *are we afraid of at their hands? The worſt they can do is to ſend us into another World. What matters it? Muſt we not alwaies expect death? Are not all the waies to Death equal? And is not that, through which a Tyrant ſends us, many times the ſhorteſt and the eaſieſt? In a word, no Tyrant was ever ſo cruel as to be above ſix months in torturing a man to death, Whereas a Feaver is ſometimes above a year ere it diſpatches him.*

Arr. Diſſ. l. 1. c. 19.

Arr. Diſſ. l. 2. c. 6.

When he met with any of thoſe Perſons

ſons, who are of opinion they tranſcend others, becauſe they are in favour with the Prince, or can derive their Pedigree from a long ſeries of Anceſtors; he treated them after a very pleaſant manner. *You imagine*, ſaid he to them, *becauſe your Grand-father was* Conſul, *your Father a* Senator, *and you are* Cæſar's Favourite, *that you are more at liberty, and of better quality than another. Know that you are more a Slave, than the meaneſt Slave among the people, and that the condition of ſuch a one is better than yours. For if he be ill-treated ſometimes by an imperious Maſter, you are continually domineer'd over and tormented by Ambition, or ſome other Paſſion. The only advantage you have over him is, that he is but a Slave in ſome courſe-cloath, and you are one in a Scarlet-coat. Beſides, if he does not his duty, he muſt expect the laſh or ſome ſuch puniſhment; whereas, if you do not yours, you are ſomewhat more honourably dealt with al; for your head is ſtruck off, as beſeems a Favourite of* Cæſar's. Arr. Diſſ. l. 4. c. 1.

Thus were Perſons of quality treated by *Epictetus*: So that his extream poverty, and the meanneſs of his extraction, could not check him out of the humour of making ſport at their Wealth, and

and imaginary Grandeurs: His vertue had exalted him above all those things; And though Fortune alwaies wreak'd her malice upon him, yet would he never repine, but pass'd away his life in perpetual content.

But if he might justly complain of the niggardlyness of Fortune towards him, as to corporeal accommodations; he was on the other side to acknowledge the profusenes of Heaven towards him, as to the advantages of his Mind. It seem'd the former had not declar'd her self his enemy; but that his triumph over her might be the more glorious. Nay, I dare affirm, that Bondage, and the infirmity of his Body were the necessary retinue of his Vertue, that it might appear with greater lustre to posterity. For, without flattery, never did any person force up constancy to so noble a height.

Origen. l. 7. cont. Cels.

While he was yet a Slave to *Epaphroditus*, that humerous Brute would needs one time, make it his sport to wrinch his Leg. *Epictetus*, perceiving that he took a certain pleasure in so doing, and that he renew'd the exercise with greater strength, said to him smiling, and without

without seeming any way mov'd thereat; *If you continue this sport, you will certainly break my Leg:* Accordingly, that having happen'd, as he had foretold it; all he said to him was, *Well, did I not tell you that you would break my Leg?* Was there ever Constancy equal to this? Was it not, as I may say, an out-braving of Fortune's extravagance, and the infirmity of our Nature. *Celsus* transported with an Enthusiasme of Philosophy, makes this patience of his transcend whatever might pretend to that name, so far as to be guilty of an abhominable impiety, by heightning the patience of *Epictetus* above that of our Saviour *Jesus Christ*. If the malice of Time had not depriv'd us of the Book which *Arrian* writ of his *Life* and *Death*, I am confident, we should have found many other as great examples of his Patience. Nor is it to be doubted, but that a man, who so suffer'd his Leg to be broken, had before made discoveries of his Constancy upon several other occasions. And indeed this Vertue was so attendant on him, that it forsook him not even in the most considerable actions of his Life. Thence it came that he said,

Celsus affirm'd the patience of Epictetus, to be greater then that of Jesus Christ.

Simpl. in Ench. Epict. init.

If

If your Oyle be ſpilt, or your Wine ſtollen out of your Cellar; you are to make this reflection in your ſelf, That by ſuch caſualties is Conſtancy purchas'd. But if he maintain'd theſe Maximes with much earneſtneſs, he obſerv'd them with no leſs rigour.

Arr. *Diſſ. l.2. c.6.* For one day this Philoſopher having bought an Iron-lamp, which he thought a very precious piece of Houſhold-ſtuff; as he was in a deep meditation in the Chimney-corner, a Thief came into his Room, and ſtole away his Lamp, without his perceiving of him. So that a while after, *Epictetus* looking about, and miſſing his Lamp, fell a ſmiling, and without any diſturbance, ſaid, *I ſhall deceive this Thief to morrow, for if he come for another Lamp, it ſhall be but an Earthen one.*

True it is, we cannot affirm this action was of equal gallantry with the former; yet, in my judgment, it is no leſs remarkable. There is not ought wherein the Genius of perſons is ſo diſcoverable, as in their trivial things inaſmuch as the Soul appears therein as it were, ſtript of the diſguiſe of all ſorts of Paſſions: Whereas in great matters ſhe is in a manner alwaies diſguis'd

guis'd; Intereſt, or Ambition cauſing her, moſt commonly, to act contrary to the natural bent of her inclination.

But to return to our Philoſopher; it may be truly ſaid, That never man knew better how to ſuffer, than he did. It was a Science he had learnt even from his tendreſt age, and wherein he improv'd himſelf to the laſt moment of his life. He needed not Companions in his misfortunes, that he might derive Conſolation from their joynt-ſuffering. He never ſought any but in himſelf; and if his mind were ſenſible of any grief, it was only of the grief of others. He thought it the greateſt mark of the malignancy of a corrupt nature, to imagine evil leſs burthenſom, when ſeveral other perſons participate of it with us: as if our ſufferings were heightned, or remitted, proportionably to the augmentation or diminution of theirs.

According to this Principle was it, that he affirmed thoſe perſons were ridiculous, who complain'd, that none were unjuſtly dealt with but themſelves. *How*, ſaid he, *if you are ſentenc'd to have your head ſtruck off, would you have all other*

Men

Men condemn'd to the same punishment; and can you find no Consolation, but in the destruction of Mankind? Thence it came that *Epictetus* so highly celebrated the constancy, and great courage of *Lateranus*. For *Nero* having condemn'd him to have his head struck off, and the Executioner having but slightly wounded him at the first blow, he had the heart to lift up his head, and to stretch forth his neck the second time. Nay, a little before his death, *Epaphroditus* making some Interrogatives to him about the Conspiracy he was charg'd withal, he undauntedly made this Answer; *If I had any thing else to say, I would tell it thy Master, and not Thee.*

Arr Dis. l. 1. c. 2.

As *Epictetus* was the most resolute, and the most constant of all Men; so were the judgments he made of Resolution, and Constancy, better and more sound, than those of any other. For though he were most intimately acquainted with these two Vertues, as being his first and most ancient inclinations, yet could he not endure them, if they had the least blemish, that rendred them insupportable. As he would not have a Man to be heartless and cowardly

ly, so would he neither have him to be temerarious. When a man might go through a plain, or some easy passage, he would not have advis'd him, to take his way through steepy and rough places. He was not of the humour of that Philosopher, who would rather have a Cart pass over his body, then turn out of his way to avoid it. *Epictetus* behav'd himself otherwise; for when *Epaphroditus* made it his sport to break his legg, he generously endur'd it; but if *Epaphroditus* had had the good nature, to have forborn that diversion, he had very much oblig'd him. He thought it as great a vanity and shame, for a man to run himself into danger, where there was no necessity for the doing of it, as there was honour and Virtue, to embrace it, when his duty oblig'd him thereto.

Diog. Laert. in vita Pyrrh.

But when Reason requir'd a man's exposing of himself to danger, he would then have him think of no delay, but look on all inconveniencies and difficulties as so many trials of our Virtue, and occasions, contributing to our glory. *Had* Hercules,

ſaid he, *ever been* Hercules, *if that* Lyon, *that* Hydra, *that wilde* Boar, *and all thoſe Monſters, whereof he diſburthen'd the Earth, had not exercis'd his courage? How is it to be imagin'd, he ſhould come to the height he attain'd, if his Virtue had not met with employment? What advantage could we have made of all his ſtrength, all his patience, and all his courage, had he not embrac'd the occaſions of making diſcoveries thereof?* Not that it is to be inferr'd hence, that he would have a man wiſh to ſee whole Provinces peſter'd with Lyons and Hydraes, that he might thereby ſignalize his valour: but he only maintain'd, That the caſuall meeting with theſe Monſters had made a fortunate diſcovery, what kind of perſon *Hercules* was.

Epictetus ſaid further, that *Helvidius* had been admirably well convinc'd of this truth; that he had perfectly ſtudied theſe Maximes, and that never any man had been more indivertible from his Sentiments, then he. When he once thought it his *devoir*, and conceiv'd himſelf oblig'd in Conſcience to do ſomething, though the Emperour, the Senate, and the People ſhould have

have conspir'd together, and contributed their joynt endeavours, to obstruct what he was resolv'd to do; yet was not all that combination of Emperour, Senate, and People able to tempt him to the least act of meanness.

It happen'd one day, that *Vespasian* was desirous to get something pass'd in the Senate. He, well acquainted with the humour of *Helvidius*, and knowing he would be sure to oppose it, forbad him to come that day into the Senate. *Helvidius* having receiv'd that message made the Emperour this return, That it was in his power to deprive him of his charge; but that while he continu'd a Senator, he could not exempt himself from doing his duty, and coming to the Senate. Be it so, reply'd *Vespasian*; I am content you should come thither, conditionally you say nothing. If I am not press'd to give my vote, answers *Helvidius*, I promise you to be silent. But there is a necessity of my requiring your advice, saies the Emperour. There is in like manner, replies *Helvidius*, a necessity, that I should answer

Aul. Gell. l. 15. c. 2.

ſwer you, and that I ſhould ſpeak what I conceive juſt and reaſonable. If you do ſo, and that it oppoſe what I would have done, added *Veſpaſian*, I ſhall put you to death. When did I ever tell you, replies *Helvidius*, that I was immortall? you will execute your charge, and I will endeavour to do the like by mine. It may be your part to ſentence me to baniſhment, and it is mine chearfully to ſubmit thereto. It is your part to order my death, and mine, reſolutely and undauntedly to receive it.

I make the leſs difficulty to fall into theſe little Digreſſions, becauſe I obſerve that *Plutarch* is no enemy to the like, and that they are not the meaneſt Ornaments of the Lives which he hath written.

Aul. l. 1. c. 2. *Epictetus* was alſo a great admirer of the Conſtancy expreſs'd by *Agrippinus*. For, ſome one telling him, that an Information, which concern'd his life was put in againſt him in the Senate, he made anſwer, I am glad of it; but what time of the day is it? Being told, it was about five in the After-noon, Come, repli'd he, let us go to the Bath,

Bath, it is time to part. Being return'd home a little while after, news was brought him, that the Information was found againſt him. Well, ſaid he, what am I ſentenc'd to? to Death? No, repli'd he who brought him the tydings, you are only condemn'd to baniſhment. Very well, repli'd *Agrippinus*, let us ſup to night at *Aricia*.

A Town about two Leagues from Rome.

Epictetus had further a particular veneration for *Pyrrho*, the *Sceptick*, upon this account, that he put no difference between *Life* and *Death*. He eſteem'd above all the reply he made to a certain perſon, who thought to make ſome ſport with him. For that man ſaying to him, Why doſt thou not therefore dye, *Pyrrho*, ſince it is indifferent to thee, whether thou liveſt or dieſt? That is the very reaſon of it, repli'd he.

In a word, *Epictetus* would have all Philoſophy to conſiſt in Conſtancy and Continence. Whence he had allwaies theſe words in his mouth, Ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου, *Bear* and *Forbear*, but the grace and energy of the ſaying is much greater in the Greek, than in

any modern Languages. Thence it came, that he was ſo much taken with the procedure of *Lycurgus* towards a *Lacedemonian*, who had ſtruck out one of his Eyes. For the people having deliver'd up the perſon to be puniſh'd; *Lycurgus*, inſtead of revenging himſelf upon him, inſtructed him in Virtue. Wherein when he had made a conſiderable proficiency, he order'd him to be brought upon the Theatre, to the great aſtoniſhment of the People, who thought him dead long before; and ſaid to them, This man, whom you deliver'd up to me as a wicked and perfidious perſon, I now return you vertuous and juſt.

The more we look on *Epictetus*, as an unbyaſs'd eſteemer of mens Actions; the more glorious is it to the memory of theſe great Perſons, to have had ſuch an Approbator as he was. He, all his life, made profeſſion of the *Stoick* Philoſophy; that is, the ſevereſt and moſt auſtere of all Antiquity. Never was there any perſon who knew better how to reduce to practice the Maximes and Precepts of that Sect. For though he may be numbred among the laſt

that

that apply'd themſelves thereto, yet was he one of the greateſt Ornaments of it. In his Diſcourſes and Actions, he imitated *Socrates*, *Zeno*, and *Diogenes*. When he undertook any work, he firſt conſider'd, what they would have done, upon the like occaſion. When he reprov'd, or inſtructed any one, he alwaies entertain'd him with ſome example of thoſe Philoſophers. In fine, he look'd on them as perſons infinitely tranſcending all others.

But, above all, he had a particular eſteem for *Socrates*, and had fram'd himſelf to a ſtile like his. In his Diſcourſes, he us'd compariſons ſo familiar, and ſo pertinent, that he inſenſibly won all to his Opinion. He was ſo perſuaſive, that he forc'd even ſuch as diſputed againſt him, to be witneſſes of the truth he ſpoke. He was no affector of polite or elegant expreſſions; but if his Diſcourſe were intelligible, and full of good ſence, after the example of that of *Socrates*, he was ſatisfy'd. In a word, He had propos'd that Philoſopher to himſelf, as the model, and rule of all his actions.

Though he much esteem'd *Pyrrho* himself, yet had he so strange a contempt for the *Pyrrhonians*, that he could not endure them. A certain Pyrrhonian one day taking a great deal of pains to prove, that the Senses alwaies deceiv'd men, he said to him, *Who of your Sect intending to go to the Stoves, mistook his way, and went to the Mill?* It was also an ordinary saying with him, *Were I a Servant to some of these* Pyrrhonians, *I should take a pleasure in tormenting them. When they said to me*, Epictetus, *poure some Oyl into the Bath, I would cast some Brine on their heads. When they call'd for Water-gruell, I would bring them Vineger. And if they complain'd of that usage, I would tell them their senses were deceiv'd, and would perswade them that Vineger and Water-gruell was the same thing, or I would make them renounce their own sentiments.*

Arr. *Diss.* l 2. c. 20.

He declar'd himself a perpetuall enemy of *Opinion* and *Fortune*, by whom yet others thought the world govern'd. *The greatest part*, said he, *of those things which we admire are but pure fantasticall humours.* For instance, *The* Iliad, *which is so much talk'd of, is it not*

a pure humour? An humour came into Paris's *head, to carry away* Helene; *she was in a humour to follow him, and* Menelaus *must needs be in an humour to be angry at it. And this speaking properly, is the main design of the Iliad. But if* Menelaus *had behav'd himself like a prudent man, and had imagin'd, that he was no small gainer, by the loss of such a Wife, what had become of the* Iliad? *Would not it, and the* Odyssés, *have been clearly lost.*

As to Fortune, *Epictetus* compar'd her to a Lady of Quality, who prostitutes her self to Servants, and the meaneſt among ſuch. He ſaid *that the Life, which had any dependence on Fortune, was like a Torrent after a violent ſhower, muddy, foule, hard to be got over, impetuous, and of ſhort continuance.* He maintain'd, on the contrary, *that a minde addicted to Vertue was like an unexhauſted ever-flowing Spring, whoſe waters were clear, ſweet and pleaſant to drink, in a word, not chargeable with any manner of corruption.*

In like manner, it was his higheſt care to heighten himſelf up more and more towards perfection in the ſtudy of vertue. He had renounc'd all other pleaſures,

pleaſures, that he might the more intentively proſecute thoſe of the mind.

Stob. Ser. 1. When he was at any great Feaſt, he minded not ſo much the ſatisfaction of his body, as that of his mind. For it was his perſuaſion, that what was beſtow'd on the body periſh'd, and was never recover'd again; whereas what was beſtow'd on the mind continu'd and was never loſt: For this reaſon did he prefer the Tranquillity and indiſturbance of the Soul, before all other things imaginable. And he held it for a Maxime, That as a man would be loath to be caſt away in a Ship, though it were ever ſo beautiful, and loaden with Treaſures and wealth: ſo how rich and ſumptuous ſoever a Houſe may be, a man ſhould never be ſo careſull in the preſerving of it, as to be cruſh'd by the burthen of exceſſive cares and diſquiets.

Stob. Ser. 38. This was alſo another ſaying of his. *If* Perſia *had been the place of your Nativity, it is certain you would have had no inclination to live in* Greece; *you would only have wiſh'd to live happily in your own Country. When therefore a man is born in Poverty, to what end ſhould he have the ambition*

ambition to be rich? Why does he not rather frame himself to a contentedness in that condition, and endeavour to live happily therein? As it were better for a man never to lye in any but a narrow Bed, and to have his health; then to be sumptuously lodg'd, and to be sick: So ought it to be a mans wish rather to preserve an undisturb'd tranquillity and composure of mind, in a mean condition, then be tormented with Grief and Vexation, amidst a greater liberality of Fortune. We must not imagine, that our unhappiness proceeds from Poverty, but from Ambition. Nor are we deliver'd from fear, by Wealth, but only by reason. Hence it comes, that he who makes provision of Reason is content in himself, and charges not his grievances on Poverty. These were the reflections of *Epictetus* on those things whereof men make so great account.

He could not endure those persons, who sought pretences to conceal, or justifie themselves in their miscarriages. He said they imitated the *Roman* Curtezans; who to cover their shame and to justifie their Lewdness, made their advantage of *Plato's* Books of *Common-Wealth*; inasmuch as that Philosopher

loſopher would have women to be common: not piercing into the ſenſe, but lewdly interpreting the words of that great man. For he does not hold that a Woman married to one man ſhould afterwards proſtitute her ſelf to all others; but he would abrogate that kind of Marriage between one Man and one Woman, to introduce another. For this reaſon *Epictetus* never bethought himſelf of any excuſe, when he was once ſenſible that he had done amiſs: on the contrary, he was never better pleas'd, than when his miſcarriages were diſcover'd to him.

Arr. *Diſſ.* *l.* 1. *c.* 7.

One day, *Rufus* bitterly reproving him, that he had not obſerv'd an omiſſion in a Syllogiſme, he made anſwer. I have not committed ſo great a crime, as if I had ſet the Capitol on fire. How, wretch, replies *Rufus*, doſt thou think there is no other crime, than that of firing the Capitol? *Epictetus* was ſo far from being diſpleas'd at ſo ſharp a retort, that he gave *Rufus* thanks, and afterwards told the ſtory to all the World.

Another time a certain perſon, who had

had been very wealthy, but then was fallen into extream Poverty, came and intreated him to write on his behalf to the People. *Epictetus*, glad to do him any service, writ him a most Obliging Letter, wherein he represented and bemoan'd his misfortune, in such terms, as might have excited compassion in Persons the least inclin'd to any. But when the other had read it, instead of giving him thanks, he return'd it him again, alledging, that his addresses to him were out of hopes of receiving some assistance from him, and not of being bemoan'd, which he needed not. That scornfulness so pleas'd *Epictetus*, that he thought himself more oblig'd to him for that Answer, than if that Worthy person had entertain'd his kindness, with the most insinuating Complements.

But above all things, *Epictetus* was extreamly nice in point of *Friendship*, and there needs be no more said, than that he was a *Stoick*, to give some security, that he was sincere and disinteres'd. He would not have a man think of consulting the Oracle, when he was concern'd in the vindication of

Enchir. Epict.

a Friend. He was perſwaded, that it ought to be attempted even with the hazard of a mans Life. As he was maintaining one day, That only a wiſe man was capable of Friendſhip; one made him this reply, That though he were no wiſe man, yet he tenderly lov'd his own Son. *'Tis your imagination*, Anſwers Epictetus. *Did you ever obſerve little whelps playing together? It might be infer'd, from their ſporting, that they had an extream kindneſs one for the other. And yet caſt but a piece of meat betwixt them, and you will finde whether they effectually love one another. The caſe is parallel with that of you and your Son. Caſt but a piece of Land between you and him, and you will diſcover whether, to gain that, he will not wiſh your Death; and whether within a while after you will not have a mortall averſion againſt him.* Eteocles *and* Polynices, *Were they not Brothers, the Children of the ſame Father and Mother? Had they not had their Education together? Had they not made a thouſand proteſtations of inviolable Friendſhip? And yet when the Kingdom fell between them, which is the fatall Morſell, did they remember, or reflect on their promiſes? Was not the*

Arr. Diſſ. l. 2. c. 22.

Friendſhip

Friendſhip between them clearly forgotten? Did there not happen dreadfull Wars between them, and were they not deſirous to kill one the other? Did not Paris *live under the ſame roof with* Menelaus? *Did they not lodge in the ſame bed? Were they not continually together? And yet, did not the imaginary beauty of a wretched Woman make an irreconcileable diſtance between them, and engage them in the moſt bloody and moſt cruel War that ever was heard of? When it would be diſcover'd,* continu'd he, *whether two men are truly Friends; there is no neceſſity of enquiring whether they be related one to the other, or have had a joynt education. Theſe are uncertain marks, and ſuch as commonly do but trapan us. We are only to inform our ſelves of their Opinions, and their Manners; and if we finde they are truly vertuous, and well-principled, we may paſs an aſſured Judgement of them that they are perfect in point of Friendſhip.*

One day, a perſon of Quality making him a viſit, he very civilly entertain'd him, and diſcours'd with him a great while. But after they had talk'd of divers things, *Epictetus* ask'd him whether he were married? I am ſo

Arr. *Diſſ.* *l.* 1. *c.* 11.

ſo, ſaid the other to my great ſorrow. What cauſe have you to be ſo much troubled, repli'd *Epictetus*, For methinks people marry only in order to a more happy Life? I am ſo miſerable, replies the other, that I have not a quiet houre. I ſo tenderly Love my Children, that I am in a perpetual apprehenſion, that ſome accident may befall them. And upon the leaſt thing being amiſs with them, I am like a diſtracted perſon, tearing the hair of my head, and deploring the wretchedneſs of my condition. Not long ſince, continu'd he, news being brought me, that my little Daughter was not well, I was ſo ſmitten thereat, that I had not the courage to ſee her, till I was aſſur'd, that ſhe had recover'd that fit, and was grown better. *Certainly* replies Epictetus, *you are a perſon of a very humorous Friendſhip; I could wiſh my Enemies had the ſame affection for me, as you have for your Children, and that they would Love me ſo well, as not to ſee me while I live. You do as a certain Gallant ſometime did, who, being entred the Liſts, was ſtruck with ſuch a fear, that he caſt his Cloak over his Eyes, while his Horſe galloped,*

galloped, and having afterwards caſually got the prize, they were forc'd to apply Sponges to him, to recover him out of the ſwound he was fallen into.

When ſome ſaid to *Epictetus*, that if he ſtill liv'd in Poverty, he would never be in a cápacity to ſerve his Friends. *How are you miſtaken!* reply'd he, *Do you think that the aſſiſting of Friends conſiſts in the lending of money?* No, no. *True it is that a man ought to do what lies in his power, to get Wealth, that he may therewith relieve them, in their neceſſities; but if you can direct me how it may be gotten, in the age we live in, with the preſervation of Vertuous life and Integrity, I promiſe you my utmoſt endeavours to do it. And if you alſo expect it from me, that I ſhould hazard the loſs of thoſe Goods I can call my own, in order to the acquiſition of others which are not true Goods, Conſider whether you are not very unjuſt, and whether you ought not to prefer a faithfull Friend before money?* This certainly was an Anſwer beſeeming a true Philoſopher. *Enchir. Epict.*

But what's particularly obſervable in *Epictetus*, is, that, of all the ancient Philoſophers, he had the beſt opi-

nions concerning the Deity, and the greateſt inſight into our Myſteries. His ſentiments are ſo conformable to *Chriſtianity*, that St. *Auguſtine*, as great an enemy as he was to the ancient Philoſophers, ſpeaks very advantageouſly of this Man; nay ſo far, as to honour him with the denomination of *Moſt Wiſe*. And no doubt St. *Auguſtine* had great reaſon to give him that Character, ſince *Epictetus* was clearly perſwaded, of the Immortality of the Soul, a great admirer of Providence, a Mortall enemy to Impiety and Atheiſme, acknowledg'd but one Divinity, and made Modeſty, not to ſay, Humility, the ground of his Morals, as we have already obſerv'd.

Arr. Diſſ. l. 1. c. 9. l. 2. c. 14.

But what I more highly eſteem in him, is, that having been Nurs'd up in the Principles of the *Stoick* Philoſophy, he ſuck'd nothing of its bitterneſs, And that he had wean'd his mind from moſt of its Errours and falſe Maximes. In a word, He had no tincture of thoſe inſolent Opinions, and ridiculous qualifications, which the *Stoicks* requir'd in their *Virtuoſo*, or Wiſe Man. A man who had reduc'd all

The Stoicks exalted their Wiſe Man above God.

all his Philoſophy to Practice, and one, who, by the acknowledgment of all ſubſequent Ages ſince his time, was the moſt knowing and the moſt humble of all the Philoſophers, ſuch a man, I ſay, muſt needs be far from any imagination of his being above God. So that if *Epictetus* was a *Stoick*, he was a much more reform'd *Stoick*, than any of the reſt. he had not ſo great a Devotion for the School of *Zeno*, or was ſo ſworn to the obſervance of his Morality, as that he would not ſometimes tranſgreſs the rules of it. On the contrary he gloried in oppoſing them, when he thought them not conſiſtent with good Manners and Prudence. and certainly, if St. *Jerome* made it no difficulty to place a *Philoſopher* of the ſame *Sect* in the Catalogue of the *Saints*, What may we think of *Epictetus*? For, not to urge that he alwaies ſpoke very clearly of the immortality of the Soul, and that *Seneca* never fully expreſs'd his ſentiment as to that point, he hath this further advantage over him, that he never approved that pernicious and tragical Maxime of *Stoicks Cloiſter*, ſo receiv'd

Arr. Diſſ. l. 1. c. 9. and ſo inveterate, *That it was lawfull for a man to be his own Murtherer:* Wheras *Seneca* alledges it, and maintains it in ſeveral places. Which is a conſideration ſo much the more preſſing, by as much as there is nothing ſo oppoſite to the Doctrine of the Goſpell.

Annot. in Diſſ. Arrian. l. 1. c. 24. I know *Wolfius* is not of this opinion, and pretends that *Epictetus* was fallen into that Errour, as well as the reſt of the *Stoicks*. but I know alſo, that it is very likely, *Wolfius* is miſtaken, as to that particular. For the only Text on which he grounds that Conjecture, is this that *Epictetus* affirms, in *Arrian*, *That when a man is weary of acting his part, he is to remember, That the Door is open.*

But when he ſaies, *The Door is open*, He means not by thoſe words, That *a man may be his own Murtherer*. His meaning is plainly this, that when we are weary of Life, and the condition we are in, it concerns us to remember, that our Term is almoſt expired, that within a ſhort time we ſhall be delivered from that diſquiet, and that infallibly we ſhall dye. This

was

was the reflection of *Epictetus*, And, to be assured of it, we need only observe, how clearly he expresses himself to the same purpose, in another passage, where he derides those, who are much troubled for the morrow. Thus then he speaks to them. *If you have any thing to eat to morrow, you will eat, if you have nought, you will forbear eating: the worst that can befall you, is to go into the other World, The Door is all-waies open for you.* This passage is as much to the point in Debate, as the other; and yet no understanding person will maintain that *Epictetus* his meaning in this place, is, *That it is lawfull for a man to be his own Executioner*, For, two or three lines before, he holds, That, *When we are persecuted by Tyrants, We must have Patience, and wait Gods leasure, to deliver us from their Persecution. It is just, adds he, that we continue in the rank wherein God hath placed us. We must leave it to him to remove us out of it, when it shall please him. The time of our aboad will not be long. When a man hath once taken this resolution, there is no Tyrant but we may defy.* This is the Constant opinion of *E-*

Ἂν σχῇς ἔξεις, ἂν μὴ σχῇ ἐξελεύσῃ ἐν ὄκται ἡ θύρα.

Arr. l. 1. c. 9.

Ἄνθρωποι ἔκδεξασθε τὸν Θεὸν, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος σημήνῃ ἡμᾶς ταύτης τῆς ὑπηρεσίας, &c.

pietatis, which is clearly oppoſite to that, which *Wolfius* would impoſe upon him.

But to return to his Life. Theſe were his true Sentiments; that admirable Modeſty, that profound Wiſedom; and, above all, that inflexible Integrity ſo remarkable in him, were the recommendations which gain'd him the Eſteem and Friendſhip of the greateſt Perſons of his time. There was an intimate Friendſhip between him and *Favorinus*, and *Herod* the *Sophiſt*, two men very Illuſtrious among the Ancients, and whoſe Lives are written by *Philoſtratus*. *Spartian*, as I have already obſerv'd, numbers him among the moſt familiar Friends of the Emperour *Hadrian*. *Themiſtius*, in his Oration to the Emperour *Jovinian*, affirmes, that he received great honours from the two *Antoninus*'s. And indeed, *Marcus Aurelius* ſpeaks very advantageouſly of him, in ſeveral places; ſo far as to parallel him with the *Zeno*'s, *Socrates*'s, and *Cryſippus*'s. In fine, he was in ſo great reputation, that *Lucian* ſatyrizes on an Ignorant perſon, who had given three thouſand

A. Gell. *l.* 17. *c.* 10. *part l.* 1. *c.* 8.

In Vit. Hadr.

Them. *Orat.* 12.

Mar. Anton. *l.* 17. *Sect.* 16. *l.* 11. *S.* 28. &c.

Ad Indoct.

ſand Drachmes for *Epictetus*'s earthen Lampe, out of a conceit he ſhould become as eminent for Learning as he was, by the light of his Lampe.

His words were ſo efficacious, and men had ſuch a reſpect and Veneration for what ever came from him, that none oppoſ'd it. One day *Herod*, the *Sophiſt*, met with a young man who profeſſ'd the *Stoick* Philoſophy, but had ſuch an humour of talking and magnifying himſelf, as if all the Greeks and Latines had been ignorant perſons in compariſon of him. The *Sophiſt* having patiently given attention to all he thought fit to ſay, ſent for the ſecond Book of *Epictetus*'s Diſcourſes, collected by *Arrian*, whereof he cauſ'd a Chapter to be read, treating of great Talkers, and preſumptous perſons, The young man was ſo ſtartled, and out of countenance at it, that he had not a word to ſay for himſelfe. From this inſtance it may be conjectur'd, what eſteeme *Epictetus* muſt be in. A. Gell. *Noct. Att. l.* 1. *c.* 2.

Of all his *Diciples*, we know not of any conſiderable perſon but *Arrian*; and yet the making of this one Diciple

is a ſufficient argument of the greatneſs of the Maſter. This is the *Arrian*, who was afterwards Maſter to *Antoninus Pius*, and had the Title given him of young *Xenophon*, upon this account, that in imitation of that Philoſopher, he had reduc'd to writing all he had heard his Maſter ſay, during his Life, and diſpos'd it into a Volume, which he Entituled, *The Diſcourſes of Epictetus*, or his *Diſſertations*, whereof there are yet remaining four Books. He afterwards made a little Treatiſe, which he called *Enchiridion*, which is an Abridgment of all the Moral Philoſophy of *Epictetus*, which is yet extant, and indiſputably one of the moſt excellent Pieces of Antiquity.

Genebr. *l.* 3 *Chron.*

Simpl. *in Proœm. Enchir.*

But what I am extreamly aſtoniſh'd at; is, that a perſon ſo highly learned as *Lipſius*, whoſe illuminated judgment found its way into the greateſt obſcurities of the *Stoick* Philoſophy, and who made it his principal ſtudy, ſhould imagine that *Epictetus* was the Author of that *Enchiridion*, and how he miſt obſerving, that *Simplicius* expreſsly affirms at the very beginning of his Book, that the *Enchiridion*

Lipſ. *in Manud. ad Sanct. Phil. l.* 1. *c* 19. Epicteti *ſcripta pauca extant* Enchiridion *ſanè egregium*, &c.

Enchiridion was compos'd by *Arrian*, and that it was an extract of the nobleſt and moſt conſiderable Maximes of *Epictetus*'s Philoſophy. The Tranſlator of *Arrians* Diſcourſes into *French*, ſo well known by the *Philarchus* of Monſieur de *Balzac*, is guilty of the ſame Errour.

In Proœm. Enchir. Ἐπικτήτου ἐγχειρίδιον συνταξεν ὁ Ἀρριανός. *See his Preface on the Diſcourſes of* Epictetus.

Arrian had alſo written another very large Book, of the *Life and Death of Epictetus*, which is clearly loſt. *Marcus Aurelius* ſpeaks of another Book, intituled, *The Commentaries of Epictetus*, which he had very exactly read over. But, in all probability, theſe *Commentaries* are no other than the *Diſcourſes* of *Epictetus*, whereof I have already ſpoken. For *Arrian*, in the Preface he made before thoſe *Diſcourſes*, calls them alſo the *Commentaries* of *Epictetus*. I conceive the equivocation proceeded from the two publications made of that Book, during the life of *Arrian*, who poſſibly gave it different Titles.

Mar. Ant. de ſe quæ ad ſe. Τὰ ὑπομνήματα.

Arrian in Præf. ad Gell. ὡς χαμὸν ὑπομνήματα, &c.

I am alſo of opinion, that thoſe Diſcourſes were much larger than we now find them, and, it may be, that, inſtead of four, there were five or ſix Books of them. This is ſo far certain, that

Gellius

Gellius cites a paſſage of the fifth Book of *Arrian's* Diſcourſes. And *Stobæus* relates ſeveral paſſages of the ſame Author, now not extant elſewhere. It is poſſible alſo, that *Arrian* left out ſeveral things at the ſecond publication which was made of his Book, and reduc'd the ſix Books he had made, to four. However it be, I cannot allow what is affirm'd by *Suidas*, that *Epictetus* writ much. For if we ever ſo little conſult what hath been written by *Arrian*, or reflect on the Maximes maintain'd by him, we ſhall hardly be induc'd to any imagination of it.

Suid. in Epict.

There are alſo certain *Anſwers*, which ſome pretend that he made to the Emperour *Hadrian*. But there needs only the reading of them to diſcover their being ſuppoſititious, and that they are falſely attributed to him. *Wolfius* put us ſometime in hopes, that we ſhould ſee *Epictetus's* Letters, which were, as he was told, in the Library of *Florence*. But it is very likely, that he, who told him that News, was not well informed of the truth, and that we may long expect the publiſhing of them.

Altercat. Hadr. & Epict.

In præf. ad Altercat. Hadr.

Of

Of what Diſeaſe *Epictetus* died, or at what time, is not well known. True it is, that *Suidas* affirmes he died under the reign of *Marcus Aurelius*. But I much queſtion the truth of it. *Salmaſius*, who hath been very large as to this particular, brings ſeveral reaſons to make it appear that *Suidas* was miſtaken.

The firſt is, that the ſame *Suidas* affirms, that *Epictetus* was a ſlave to *Epaphroditus*, *who was Captain of the Life-Guard to Nero*. Now, from the death of *Nero* to *Marcus Aurelius's* advancement to the Empire, there are near ninety four years. Nay before *Epictetus* was in a condition to do *Epaphroditus* any ſervice, and to come from *Hierapolis* to *Rome*, he muſt be of ſome Age. So that according to this computation he muſt have lived near a hundred and twenty years: which is not eaſily believ'd. And yet there may be ſomewhat in the conjecture, though not enough to make it convictive, for it is poſſible, as *Lipſius* hath well obſerv'd, that he did not ſerve *Epaphroditus*, till after the death of *Nero*. Yet *Lipſius* may be anſwer'd, by

Suid. *in* Epict.

Salm. *in Not. ad* Epic. & Simpl.

Lipſ. *in* Manud. *ad* St. Phil. l. 1. c. 19.

Suid. in Epict. Σωματοφύλαξ τῦ Νέρωνος. Ant. de his quæ ad se.

by alledging that *Epaphroditus* is here ſtiled Captain of *Nero's* Life Guard; which argues that *Nero* was then living.

Salmaſius's ſecond reaſon is, that *Marcus Aurelius* numbers not *Epictetus* among thoſe whom he had heard. He only affirms, that he had ſeen his *Commentaries*, by the means of *Junius Ruſticus*, who ſent him them. This reaſon ſeems to me much weaker than the former. For, beſides that *Epictetus* might at that time be retir'd to *Nicopolis*, he died haply at the beginning of *Marcus Aurelius*'s Reign. And *Suidas* affirms only, that he came to the time of that Emperour. And ſo though *Epictetus* had lived till the beginning of his Reign, it is poſſible that Emperour might not ſee the *Commentaries* of *Epictetus*, till after his death.

The third reaſon alledged by *Salmaſius* ſeems to me to be of no validity at all. He ſaies, that *Epictetus*'s Lamp was ſold in *Lucian's* time, and thence he infers, that *Epictetus* was then dead. But this does not prove any thing. For there are very high probabilities, if not certainty, that *Lucian* died not till after

after *Marcus Aurelius*. And ſo, that Lamp might have been ſold in *Lucian's* time, though *Epictetus* liv'd to the time of that Emperour. Nay it is poſſible it was ſold in the Life-time of *Epictetus*; and in that caſe, there would be no difficulty.

The fourth Reaſon is, That *A. Gellius*, who writ in the time of *Antoninus Pius*, or at the beginning of *Marcus Aurelius's* Reign, affirmes of *Epictetus* thus, *The memory of Epictetus the Philoſopher is yet freſh.* The paſſage is not faithfully ſet down by *Salmaſius*. For it is preciſely ſaid in *Aulus Gellius*, *That Epictetus alſo was a Slave, is of freſh memory.* That is, it was of freſh memory that *Epictetus* had been a Slave, and not ſimply that he had been.

A. Gell. l. 11. c. 19. Ita Salmaſ. reſtituit locum Gellii in Not. ad Impl De Epict. autem Philoſopho recentior eſt memoria. Ita Gell. De Epict autem Philoſopho, quod is quoq ſervus fuerit, recentior eſt memoria.

To conclude, The laſt Reaſon brought by *Salmaſius*, is, that *Aulus Gellius* ſpeaks in another place, in theſe Terms, *I have heard Favorinus ſay that Epictetus ſaid*, &c. So that, ſince *Favorinus* died under the Emperour *Hadrian*, *Salmaſius*, infers, that *Epictetus* could not have liv'd up to the time of *Marcus Aurelius*. This reaſon is not

convictive, becauſe *Favorinus* might inform *Aulus Gellius*, of what, Epictetus ſaid, though *Epictetus* were not dead. Yet muſt we allow it ſome ground. For *Aulus Gellius*, who writ in the time of *Antoninus Pius*, the Predeceſſor of *Marcus Aurelius*, when he ſpeaks of *Epictetus*, expreſſes himſelf in theſe Terms. *Epictetus ſaid. That venerable Old Man ſaid, I have been inform'd by ſuch a one, that Epictetus ſaid.* Which clearly argues that he was not then living. And what makes me the more inclinable to this opinion, is, that it is probable, that *Arrian* had not made any collection of the *Diſcourſes* of *Epictetus*, till after the death of that Philoſopher. And if ſo, it is impoſſible that what is affirmed by *Suidas* ſhould be true, and that *Epictetus* liv'd up to the time of *Marcus Aurelius*. For in the time of *Aulus Gellius*; who, as hath been obſerved, writ under *Antoninus Pius*, theſe *Diſcourſes* were already publiſhed, and generally known. True it is, that *Arrian* might have made that Book in the Life-time of *Epictetus*, but there is little probability, and it will not eaſily be preſum'd, that the *Diſcourſes*,

courſes, and memorable things of a perſon yet living ſhould be publiſhed.

There is yet another very conſiderable difficulty, which hath not been obſerved by any one. This is; that, from *Nero's* death, to the Edict ſet forth by *Domitian*, touching the Baniſhment of the Philoſophers, there is very little above twenty years. For that Edict was publiſhed in the eighth year of his Reign, as is affirmed by *Euſebius*. Now if the conjecture of *Lipſius* be true, and that *Epictetus* did not ſerve *Epophroditus*, till after *Neros* death, it would follow, that at the time of that Edict, *Epictetus* could not be above eighteen or nineteen years of Age. Which cannot be granted, For then he had obtained his Liberty, and was even at that very time in great reputation; inaſmuch as it is affirmed by *Aulus Gellius*; that, upon the qualification of a Philoſopher, he was forced to retire to *Nicopolis*. It muſt needs be allowed then, that he was at that time about thirty years of Age. But if he were of that Age, at the time of that Edict, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that he

he lived near a hundred and eight or nine years, to come up to the time of *Marcus Aurelius*. Which is not probable; since *Lucian*, who lived in that very time makes no mention of *Epictetus*, in his Dialogue *Of Long-livers*. True it is, that *Eusebius* speaks also of a second Edict against the *Philosophers*, which was not published till the fifteenth year of *Domitian's* Reign. But, not to take notice, that he is the only person of all the Chronologers and Historians, who makes any mention of this second Edict, *Scaliger* precisely observes, that the Edict, whereof *Aulus Gellius* speaks, (which is the same we now discourse of) was the first which was publish'd in the eight year of *Domitians* Reign.

Euseb. *in Chron.*

This reason seems to me so strong, that I should make no difficulty to affirm, that *Suidas* was mistaken, if I had not met with a passage of *Themistius*, where he precisely saies, *That the two Antoninus's rendred great honours to Epictetus*. Yet might it be answer'd, that what is said is by an Orator, who observed not that strictness, which was requisite in a faithfull Historian. Or haply

Them. *in Orat. ad* Jovin.

haply that *Marcus Aurelius* was a great honourer of *Epictetus*, in the time of *Hadrian*, and *Antoninus Pius*, and before he came to be Emperour. Or rather, that he did him those honours after his death. As indeed we see, by the Books he hath left us, that he had a particular Veneration for his Memory. In fine, This is not without some difficulty, and I should be loath to be absolutely decisive in the point. I therefore think it sufficient, that I have simply laid down the doubts of both sides. And yet, after a mature examination of these things, if I may presume to give my judgment, I am the rather inclin'd to comply with what is affirm'd by *Salmasius*, that *Epictetus* reach'd not the Reign of *Marcus Aurelius*. For besides that *Suidas* is an Author who hath not alwaies light on the truth, it was a most undeniable mistake in him, when he affirm'd, that *Epictetus* had written much. So that it is possible he may also be mistaken in his computation of the time. Howere it be, yet this is certain, that *Epictetus* was regretted by all the illustrious

Perſons in his time, and that his memory will be precious to poſterity. And this all I could meet with of his *Life*, which hitherto hath not been written in any Language, ſince that *Life* of *Epictetus*, done by *Arrian*, hath been loſt.

A CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE, to find out the time of *Epictetus*'s death.

Years from the Foundation of Rome.	*Years from* Nero.	
807	1	
808	2	Nero.
809	3	
810	4	
811	5	
812	6	
813	7	
814	8	
815	9	
816	10	
817	11	
818	12	*Epaphroditus.*
819	13	*Epictetus.*
820	14	Galba.
821	15	Otho. Vitellius.
822	16	

823	17	Veſpaſian.
824	18	
825	19	
826	20	
827	21	
828	22	
829	23	
830	24	
831	25	Titus Veſp.
832	26	
833	27	
834	28	Domitian.
835	29	
836	30	
837	31	
838	32	
839	33	
840	34	*Edict for the baniſhment of the Philoſophers.*
841	35	
842	36	
843	37	
844	38	
845	39	
846	40	
847	41	Nerva.

848

848	42	
849	43	
850	44	Trajan.
851	45	
852	46	
853	47	
854	48	
855	49	
856	50	
857	51	
858	52	
859	53	
860	54	
861	55	
862	56	
863	57	
864	58	
865	59	
866	60	
867	61	
868	62	
869	63	
870	64	Hadrian.
871	65	
872	66	

873	67
874	68
875	69
876	70
877	71
878	72
879	73
880	74
881	75
882	76

883	77	
884	78	
885	79	
886	80	
887	81	*Favorinus's Death.*
888	82	
889	83	*Antoninus Pius.*
890	84	
891	85	
892	86	

893	87
894	88
895	89
896	90
897	91

898

898	92	
899	93	
900	94	
901	95	
902	96	*Epictetus's Death.*
903	97	
904	98	
905	99	
906	100	
907	101	
908	102	
909	103	*Aulus Gellius.*
910	104	
911	105	
912	106	
913	107	Marcus Aurelius.
914	108	
915	109	
916	110	
917	111	
918	112	
919	113	
920	114	
921	115	
922	116	

923	117	
924	118	
925	119	
926	120	
927	121	
928	122	
929	123	
930	124	
931	125	
932	126	Commodus.

933	127	*Lucian's Death.*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS.

Honesta res est læta Paupertas.

Senec. Ep. 2.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS.

THere are ſome things which have their dependance on us. As *Opinion, Inclination, Deſire, Averſion*; in a word, all our Operations. There are others alſo which have no dependance on us. As the *Body, Wealth, Reputation, Soveraignty*, and whatever comes not within the Sphear of our Action. *Sect.* 1.

That

Sect. 2. That which hath its dependance on us, is, of its own Nature, Free, and cannot be obſtructed, nor forbidden by any one. On the contrary, That which hath not its dependance on us, is weak, ſervile, eaſily obſtructed, and ſubject to another.

Sect. 3. Remember then, that if you take to be Free, that which, of its own nature is Servile; and if you conſider what is ſubject to another, as a thing proper to your ſelf; Remember, I ſay, that you will meet with great obſtructions, and that you will be diſturbed in all your deſignes, that you will be expos'd to a thouſand diſquiets, and in fine, that you will charge your misfortunes upon the Gods and Men. But, on the contrary, if you are perſwaded that that only belongs to you which really does ſo, and can conſider, as alienated from you, that which in effect is ſo, aſſure your ſelf, that nothing will be able to divert you from what you have propoſed to your ſelf, that you will not attempt any thing with a kind of violence to your ſelf, that you will not

not blame or accuſe any one, that no body will give you any Check, that you will have no enemies; and in fine, that you will never be ſubject to the leaſt regret.

If you are deſirous of goods ſo great as theſe are, know, it is not ſufficient, for the attaining of them, that they be in ſome meaſure deſired; but it is alſo requiſite, that you be readily diſpos'd to a renunciation of certain things, and, for a time, to a deprivation of ſome others. For, if not ſatisfy'd with that whereof you are poſſeſs'd, you are ambitious of advancement into Charges, or the acquiſition of Wealth, remember, you will abſolutely loſe the aſſured means, whereby Liberty and Felicity are acquirable, and that haply, after-all, you will be defeated of what you courted with ſo much earneſtneſs. *Sect.* 4. *With* Politan *and* Wolfius *I put* ἐυδ' *out of the Text in this paſſage.*

When you meet with any diſpleaſing occurrence, accuſtom your ſelf to this reflection, that it is not ſuch as it ſeems to be, and that it is only a pure *Sect.* 5.

pure imagination. When you ſhall have made that reflection, examine what it may be, and make your advantage of the rules you have for that purpoſe. Conſider whether it be any of thoſe things which have their dependence on you. For otherwiſe if it have not any, be immediately ſatisfy'd, that it concerns you not.

Sect. 6. Know, that the End of Deſire is the obtaining of what is deſired, and that the End of Averſion is, that one fall not into that which he would eſchew. And as he is Unfortunate who is ſruſtrated of what he wiſhes; ſo he is miſerable who falls into that which he would moſt avoid. If therefore you have an averſion only for what hath its dependence on you, as for falſe Opinions, be aſſur'd, that you will never fall into that which you hate. But if you have an averſion for that which depends not on you, as for Diſeaſes, Death, or Poverty, queſtion not but you will become Miſerable; ſince it is not in your power to avoid them, and that you will infallibly fall into them.

If

If you are desirous to be Happy, never have any repugnance for that which hath not its dependance on you, but direct all your aversion against that which is obstructive to the nature of the things dependent on your Liberty. Moreover, make no sudden wishes of any thing with too much earnestness; For if you desire things not dependent on your self, it is impossible but you must be frustrated thereof; and if you desire those which have their dependance on your self, know, that you are not sufficiently taught what is necessary for the desiring of them out of a vertuous regard. If therefore you would do well, approach them so as that you be able to withdraw your self from them, when you shall think fit. But let all this be done with discretion and reservedness. *Sect.* 7.

The true expedient to avoid being ever troubled, is, to consider all the things that are for our pleasure, or for our advantage, or such as for which we have any affection, as they are in themselves. We must begin to *Sect.* 8.

to examine even to the least important. For example, when you remove an earthen vessel, bethink your self that it is an earthen vessel which you do remove, and that it may be easily broken. For having made this reflection, if it chances to break, you will not be troubled at it. In like manner, if you love your Son, or your Wife, reflect that the person you love is of humane race; for by that means, if they come to dye, you will not be surpriz'd at it.

I hear follow Simplicius, *who instead of* χότραν σέργης *puts* χύτραν σείης.

Sect. 9. Before you undertake any work, examine of what kind it is. If you have resolved to go into a Bath, before you set forth, represent to your self all the insolences that are committed in those places. They there cast water at one; they force him out of his place; he is subject to affronts; he may lose his cloaths. Make no question but you would more safely execute what you undertake, if you say to your self; I will go into the Bath, but I will also keep to the course of Life, which I have propos'd to my self. Observe this Maxime in all

all your enterprises. For by that means, if any obstruction or disgrace happens to you, as you bath your self, it will be without disturbance to you, and you will presently say, I came not hither only to bath my self, but I came also with a resolution not to do any thing contrary to my setled course of life, which I should not observe, if I endured the impertinences committed hear with any kind of regret or dissatisfaction.

The disturbances which men are in proceed not from the things themselves; but only from the opinions they conceive of them. For example, to speak rightly of it, Death is not any Evil; since that if it were such, it would have appear'd dreadful and unpleasing to *Socrates*, as well as to other men. No no, it is only the Opinion men have of death which renders it dreadful. When therefore we are any way disturb'd, or troubled, we have none to quarrel at, but our selves and our Opinions. *Sect.* 10.

Sect. 11. It is a great diſcovery of ignorance and a brutiſh diſpoſition to be reproaching others with their miſeries. He begins to enter into the way of wiſdome, who charges only himſelf with his own misfortune. But he is come to the perfection of wiſdom, who neither chargeth himſelf nor others.

Sect. 12. Never make any oſtentation of the excellency which is in another. If a Horſe could ſay, that he is a beautifull Creature, it were ſupportable in his mouth. But when you make it your brag that you have an excellent well-ſhap'd Horſe can you tell what you do? you boaſt of what belongs not to you. What is there then that is yours? The uſe of what falls under your ſight. And hence it comes, that if you look on things conformably to their nature, and make ſuch judgments of them as you ought, then ſhall it be lawfull for you to make your brags thereof; inaſmuch as your exultation is for a good, whereof you are effectually poſſeſs'd.

A Sentiment ſomewhat hard.

If

If you go to Sea, and the Ship come *Sect.* 13.
to Land at some place, you are at liberty to go out of it, to take in fresh water; nay if you have a mind to gather of the Shells you meet with in your way, no body will hinder you. But it is still expected that your thoughts should be upon the Ship, and that you should be attentive to the masters call; for you must be ready to leave all, least upon your neglect, he might order you to be cast into the Vessel with your hands and feet bound like a beast. The same is to be said in the case of humane Life. If God is pleas'd to give you a Wife, or Children, it is permitted you to take them, and to have your enjoyments of them. But if it happen that God calls you, you must leave them without any further thoughts of them, and make hast to the Vessel. And if you are already well advanc'd in age, have a care you be not at any great distance from it, out of a fear you be not ready, when you shall be called.

Never desire that things should happen as you would have them; but endeavour to make your wishes compliant with the emergencies. By this means, what ever comes to pass will be conformable to your wishes.

Sect. 15. Sickness is an impediment to the Body, but not so to the Will. For example, when a man is Lame, it is an obstruction to his feet in going; but that hinders not his Will to do what it is inclin'd to, if it does not undertake any thing but what it is able to compass. Make the same consideration of all the things that happen, and you will find, that it is not you that are incommodated by them, and that it is alwaies some other.

Sect. 16. In whatever shall happen to you, be mindfull to consider, what means you have to secure your self against it. If, for example you see a beautiful Youth, or a fair Virgin, bethink your self, that you have Temperance, which is a powerful preservative against Beauty. If you are oblig'd to

to undertake ſomething not to be overcome without much labour and hardſhip, have your recourſe to Patience. If you have receiv'd any injury, arm your ſelf with Conſtancy. For if you accuſtom your ſelf alwaies to act after this manner, occurrent Objects will have no prevalence over you.

Never ſay that you have loſt any thing, but let it be your conſtant ſaying, that you have reſtor'd it. When your Son or your Wife dye, ſay not that you have loſt them, but ſay rather that you have reſtor'd them to him who had beſtow'd them on you. But when ſome part of your Inheritance is taken away from you, muſt it be ſaid in like manner, that you have reſtor'd it? you think haply that you ought not to uſe that kind of expreſſion, becauſe he is ſome wicked perſon who hath depriv'd you of it? As if it concern'd you, by whoſe means your Land returnes to him who had given it you. As long therefore as you ſhall have it at your own diſpoſal, look on it as if it were *Sect.* 17.

anothers, and part with it, as little troubled, as Travellors are when they leave the Innes where they had lodg'd.

Sect. 18. If you are desirous to make any advancement in the study of Vertue, wean your mind from those sorts of Imaginations. *If I be not carefull of my affairs, I shall not have wherewithall to subsist. If I chastize not my Son, he will prove undutifull.* Learn that it is better to dye of hunger, and preserve a greatness of courage, and tranquillity of mind to the last gaspe, than to live in abundance, with a Soul full of disturbance and torment. Learn, I say, that you ought rather to suffer your Son to become undutifull and wicked, than to become your self unhappy. In a word you must prefer the serenity of your own mind before all concerns. But to attain that, it is precedently requisite, that you make trial of your self even to things that are most inconsiderable. For example, if your Oyl be spilt, or your Wine stollen out of your Cellar, make this reflection and say in your

your ſelf; At this rate muſt a Man purchaſe Tranquillity and Conſtancy. And indeed nothing is got without ſome pains, and it is neceſſary, that what we have ſhould coſt us ſomething. Do the like when you call your Servant. Imagine, that he is not ready, and that if he were, he will not haply do any thing of what you deſire of him. Howere it be, have a care that he has not the power to put you into any indignation, and to cauſe any diſturbance in your mind, when he hath an humour to do it.

Never be troubled that you ſhould paſs for an extravagant perſon in the Apprehenſions of the Multitude, only upon their obſervance of your contempt of external things. Nor be ever deſirous of being accounted a man of excellent endowments. If it unexpectedly happen, that people make any account of you, then moſt miſtruſt your ſelf; inaſmuch as it is extreamly hard to be attentive to what is external, and to ſtick cloſe to a reſolution correſpondent to *Sect.* 19.

Nature, and the course of Life which you have propos'd to your self; and it must needs come to pass, that following the one you will be forc'd to relinquish the other.

Sect. 20. If you desire that your Wife, your Children, and your Friends should live alwaies, you are at a loss of judgment; for it is as much as to wish that what hath not any dependance on you, should be absolutely dependent on you, and that what is anothers should belong to you. In like manner, if you expect that your Son should commit no misdemeanour, you are no less ridiculous. For it is as much as to wish, that Vice should not be Vice. If therefore you would never be frustrated of your desires, desire only those things which are dependent on your self.

Sect. 21. He is truly Master of all things, in whose power it is to retain such as he will, and to reject such as are displeasing to him. Whoever then hath a design to be free after this manner, must accustom himself not to have any

any desire, nor any aversion for such things as are dependent on another: for if he act otherwise, he will certainly fall into Servitude.

Remember that your demeanour in Life must be such, as if you were at a great Feast. If any Dish be presented to you, you may decently help your self what you think fit of it. If it be design'd only to pass by you, far be it from you to stop it, and to put your hand rashly into it. Expect patiently till it return to you again. Thus ought you to behave your self towards your Children, towards your Wife, towards the Magistrates, towards Riches, and towards all other things of that nature. For by this means, you will become worthy to be entertain'd at the Table of the Gods. But if you are so generous as to refuse even that which is presented to you, you will not only deserve admission to the table of the Gods, but you will be worthy also to participate of their power. And it was for this kind of demeanour that *Diogenes* and *Heraclitus* were reputed divine men, *Sect.* 22.

men, as indeed they were.

Sect. 23. When you shall observe any one sighing, either upon a remembrance that his son is gone abroad to travel, or that he hath lost what he was possest of, be not surpriz'd at the Object and imagine not the person to be really unhappy, for the loss of things not within his disposal. But make this distinction within your self, and presently say; It is not that Accident which afflicts the man; for there are others concern'd in the like that are not any way disturb'd thereat; it is the opinion which he hath conceiv'd thereof that torments him. Then use your utmost endeavours to undeceive him, and to recover him out of evil Opinion. Nay, if you think it convenient, you may pretend sadness, and a certain fellow-feeling of his affliction. But have a care that Grief do not effectually seize your heart, while you think only to personate it.

Sect. 24. Remember your self, that you are to act here the part which the Master of

of the Revels hath been pleas'd to assign you. If your part be short, be short in the acting of it; if it be long, be content to go through with it. If he have appointed you to do that of a poor Man, endeavour to acquit your self in the action as well and as naturally as you can. In fine, if he have impos'd upon you that of a Prince, or a Lame person, or a Tradesman, it is your concern, to act according to what is assign'd you, and hath been directed by another.

If it chance that you hear a *Crow* croaking, be not the least troubled at it. But let this be your immediate reflection, I am not the person threatned by that *Crow*; it may haply be my Body, or the little Estate I am possess'd of, or my Reputation, or my Children, or my Wife, for as to my own part, there is not any thing but presages happiness to me; in regard that, of whatever shall happen, it depends only on my self to make all the advantage I can. *Sect.* 25.

You

Sect. 26. You may be invincible, if you undertake not any engagement, but such as you are assur'd of the success thereof, and where the obtaining of the Victory depends only on your self.

Sect. 27. If you observe any one advanc'd to Dignities, or in favour and credit, be not surpriz'd at the outward appearance of it, and say not, that he is therefore happy. For since the true tranquillity of the mind consists in our wishes only of what depends on our selves, the lustre of Grandeurs ought not to raise any envy or jealousy in us. Nor should you entertain any ambition of being a Senator, a Consul, or an Emperour, the only business you are to mind, is Freedom. That ought to be the ultimate end of all your pretensions. Now to attain that, there is but one way, which is, to slight whatever depends not on us.

Sect. 28. Remember also it is not either he who injures you, nor yet he who smites you that offends you, but it is the

the Opinion you have conceiv'd thereof. When therefore any one ſhall occaſion your being angry, know, that not he, but your own Opinion hath incens'd you. Accordingly you ought to be very carefull that you be not tranſported by your paſſion; for if you delay it for ever ſo little a while, you will the more eaſily overcome it.

Let Death, Baniſhment, and all thoſe other things, which the greateſt part of Men put into the number of Evils, be your daily Meditation; but let your thoughts be particularly fixt on Death. For by this means you will never have any mean and ſervile conſideration, nor ever wiſh any thing with paſſion. *Sect.* 29.

If you have a deſign to perfect your ſelf in the ſtudy of Philoſophy, prepare your ſelf, before you undertake any thing, to endure the deriſion of all the World. It will be ſaid to you, How are you become a Philoſopher of a ſudden? Whence came you by that ſevere aſpect? Laugh *Sect.* 30.

at

at all that, conditionally that what is ſaid be not true, and that you have not that gravity, wherewith you are reproached. Do you only demean your ſelf ſo towards what ſeems beſt to you, that nothing be able to divert you from it, and continue conſtant thereto, as if God had appointed you to do ſo. If you perſiſt in the ſame reſolution, and prove conſtant in the ſame eſtate, you will become the object of their admiration who before derided you. If on the contrary you flag, and if once you give way to any change of reſolution, all you have done will only occaſion others to repeat their deriſions of you.

Sect. 31. Suffer not your mind to be diſtracted with imaginations of this kind, that you will not be conſider'd, and that you will not be reſpected, and honoured. For if it were an evil not to receive honour, the conſequence would be, that it were in the power of another to make us unhappy. Which cannot be, in regard that the ſame reaſon which exempts

us from being involv'd in Vice, by the act of another, exempts us also from being involv'd in evil, by the act of another. Is it a thing at our disposal to be advanc'd to soveraign dignities, or, to be invited to great Feasts, or in fine, to be possess'd of all the other goods not dependent on us? No, it is clearly out of our reach. How then can you say, that you shall live in Disesteem and Ignominy, if you have not the enjoyment of these kinds of things? How, I say, can you complain, that you shall not be respected, when you are to confine all your desires, and all your pretensions, within your self, and what depends on you, where you are allow'd to exalt your self as much as you please? You will haply reply, if I live so, I shall never be in a condition to serve my Friends. Ah! How are you mistaken! How do you imagine that this proposition is to be understood, a man is oblig'd to assist his Friends? 'Tis not thereby meant, that he is to supply them with Mony, or to make them Citizens of *Rome*, since that is not in our power,

power, and that it is impoſſible for one to beſtow that on another which he hath not himſelf. I foreſee the anſwer you will make me, to wit, that a Man is to uſe all induſtry to raiſe himſelf to wealth and credit, that he may be able to relieve his Friends in their neceſſities. But if you can ſhew me a way whereby they may be attain'd without hazarding the loſs of vertuous Inclination, Sincerity, and Generoſity, I promiſe you that I will attempt alwaies to do it. If then you expect from me that I ſhould hazard the loſs of my own goods, to endeavour the acquiſition of others for you, which are not true goods, conſider whether you are not unjuſt and unreaſonable. Reflect then, whether you ought not to make greater account of a ſincere, vertuous, and faithfull Friend than of Mony? Do therefore all that lies in your power to preſerve theſe qualities in me, and never preſs me to do any thing which may reduce me into a capacity of looſing them. You may yet poſſibly make this further reply,

that

that by this means you will not be able to ſerve your Country. But what do you mean by thoſe words? 'Tis true, you will not be able to adorn it with Triumphal Arches or publick Baths. They are not Smiths who furniſh the City with Shoes, nor hath it Arms from Shoemakers. 'Tis well that every one act according to his profeſſion? What do you imagine that you contribute nothing of advantage to your Country, when you ſupply it with an Inhabitant, who is a perſon of Worth and Integrity? Know, that you could not have done it a greater ſervice. No more then henceforth of that Diſcourſe. Say not that you are of no account in your City. It matters not what rank you are in, provided you mind the improvement of Honour and Fidelity in it. Do you imagine you will be advantageous to your Country, if you quit the purſuit of Vertues? Imagine to your ſelf what benefit it can receive from you, when you ſhall become Impudent and Perfidious.

Sect. 32. Take it not ill, to ſee any one plac'd at Table above you, or ſaluted before you, or to find people inclin'd to follow his advice, rather than yours: for if the things are good, you ought to be glad they happen to him; if on the contrary they are bad, you ſhould not have any regret at their not befalling your ſelf. Beſides, remember, that ſince you profeſs not to do ought for the attainment of external things, it is no miracle if they happen not to you, and that other perſons, who have us'd their utmoſt endeavours to attain them, are prefer'd before you. Nor indeed is it juſt, that he who ſtirs not out of his Houſe ſhould be of equall credit with him who ſpends moſt of his time in Viſits, and is perpetually at the gates of Grandees. It is not, I ſay, reaſonable, that he who cannot be induc'd to commend any one, ſhould be equally conſider'd with him, who beſtows exceſſive praiſes on the moſt inconſiderable Actions. He certainly muſt be an unjuſt, and withall an inſatiable perſon, who deſires to have theſe ſorts of

of goods for nothing, and without buying them, at the price they coſt. Be it ſuppos'd, for example, that Lettices are to be ſold, and that they are worth a half-peny, if any one gives that rate, he may have them. But if you will not give any thing for them, you ſhall go without them. Shall this render your condition worſe than that of the other? By no means; for if he hath the Lettices, you have your Mony. The caſe is the ſame as to thoſe things we ſpeak of. If you are not invited to a Feaſt, it argues you have not paid your Club. The Founder of the Feaſt ſells it for flatteries, for compliance, and for ſubmiſſions. If you are deſirous to be admitted thereto, reſolve to purchaſe it at the price ſet upon it. For to pretend to theſe things, without doing what is neceſſary for the obtaing of them, argues Covetuouſneſs and want of Judgment. Do you imagine alſo, that, if you loſe that Supper, you have nothing in requital? Aſſure your ſelf you have ſomewhat that is much more excellent. You have not prais'd him

whom you had no mind to praiſe. You have not born with his inſolence, wherewith he treats ſuch as come to his Table, this is the advantage you have made.

Sect. 33. We may underſtand what Nature deſires by the ſentiment we have of the things which concern us not. When our neighbours Servant break a Glaſs, we preſently ſay, it is an ordinary accident. You ſhould demean your ſelf ſo, when your own is broken, and be as cold and indifferent, as you were when your neighbours was broken. Apply this alſo to greater matters. When your neighbours Wife or Child dies, no body ſaies there is any thing in it but what is natural. But when that accident happens to our ſelves, we break forth into lamentations and clamours; Ah! How unhappy am I, Ah! What a wretched perſon am I? And yet we ſhould remember our ſelves, that we ought to be ſuch upon this emergency as we are when the ſame thing happens to another.

The

The nature of Evil is, in the World, as a Mark, which is ſet there to direct us into the right way, and not to put us out of it. *Sect.* 34.

If any one ſhould deliver up your Body to the firſt perſon he met, that he might do what he pleas'd with it, I am confident you would not take it well, and that you would be diſpleas'd thereat. And in the mean time you are not aſham'd, to expoſe your Soul to the fantaſtick humour of all the World. For as ſoon as any reviling word is ſaid to you, you are troubled, and tranſported with grief and indignation. Do not therefore undertake any thing, without conſidering beforehand what ought to precede, and what muſt be the conſequence of ſuch an enterpriſe; for if you act otherwiſe, it will come to paſs, that haply your deſign will prove fortunate at the beginning, and that you will take a pleaſure therein. But be aſſured, that you will afterwards be aſham'd of it, and that, ſooner or later, you will have occaſion to repent you of it. *Sect.* 35.

Sect. 36. No doubt it would be a great satisfaction to you to gain the Victory at the Olympick Games. I assure you, it should be as much my desire as yours. For when all's done, we must acknowledge that it is a very gallant thing. But if you have that design, it is requisite, that you consider what is precedent, and what is consequent to such an enterprise. When you shall have made that reflection, take notice of what you ought to observe. Accustom your self to keep within your own rank; Not to eat, but upon necessity; To abstain from all sorts of delicate, and picquant sawces; Never to drink out of humor or wantonness; Nay, to forbear the drinking of Wine, if you are not commanded to do it; To do your exercise at the appointed hours, in hot weather, in cold weather, not suffering any thing to divert you from it. In fine, You must resign up your self to the Master of the Exercises, as to a Physitian. And then you may enter the Lists. But you must also direct your apprehensions to all the things which may happen, one while,

while, of hurting your Hands, and your Feet, and another of having your Mouth full of Duſt, ſometimes of being well Cudgel'd, and after all this ſtruggling, you alſo run the hazard of getting the worſt. Now if nothing of all this ſtartle you, and that you ſtill perſiſt in your former deſign, then you may venture into the Ring. For if you demean your ſelf otherwiſe, it will happen to you, as to thoſe little Children, who now take up them to be Wraſtlers, then Pipers, then Fencers, then Trumpetters, and then actors of Tragedies, undertaking all ſorts of Profeſſions, though they are incapable of exerciſing any. So you will be a Wraſtler, a Gladiator, an Orator, a Philoſopher, and of all this nothing. You will imitate, like an Ape, whatever you ſee done by others, and you will ſlightly quit one thing, to embrace another. Would you know the cauſe of it? 'Tis this, that you undertake all without recollection, and that you are inconſiderately inclin'd thereto, and that you comply only with the ſudden ſallies of your own

fantaſtick humour. You behave your ſelf like thoſe who have an itching inclination to be Philoſophers, when they hear ſome one ſay, *Ah, how excellently was that ſaid by Socrates! Who could raiſe an argument to that height, and preſs it with ſo much vigour as he!*

Sect. 37. O man, be who you will, if you are deſirous to compaſs your deſigns, conſider beforehand what you would do, and ſee, whether that which you undertake be conformable to your nature or not. If you are deſirous to venture at the Exerciſes, as Wraſtling or the like, conſider whether your Arms are ſtrong enough, and whether your Limbs and Reins are fit, and well-ſet for it; in regard that this man is naturally deſign'd to one thing, and that, to another. When you ſhall have taken a reſolution to become a Philoſopher, if you think to eat, and drink, and act the delicate perſon, as you did before, you will be extreamly miſtaken. You muſt reſolve to be vigilant, to be induſtrious, to forſake your Friends,

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to be ſlighted, ſometimes by a Servant, to ſee all others more honoured, and in greater credit than you with eminent Perſons, Magiſtrates, Judges, and in any affair whatſoever. Reflect then on all theſe difficulties, and conſider whether you had not rather enjoy Tranquillity of Mind, Freedom, and Conſtancy. For if you make not this reflection, I muſt mind you of having a care, that you ſollow not the example of thoſe little Children I ſpoke of before, and be one while a Philoſopher, ſoon after a Receiver of the publick Taxes, then an Orator, and in fine a Lieutenant to *Cæſar*. Believe me, all theſe employments will not ſadge well together. It is requiſite you take it into your conſideration, that you are but one Man, and that it is neceſſary, you ſhould be abſolutely good, or abſolutely bad. For, in a word, you muſt either only proſecute the cultivation of your Mind and Reaſon, or apply your ſelf to the purſuit of external things, and abſolutely addict your ſelf thereto. For it is impoſſible for a man to do both

both together. That is to ſay, it is neceſſary that you either keep within the Sphear of a Philoſopher, or come into the common claſs of the meaner ſort of People.

Sect. 38. All the Devoirs and Reſpects we render ought to be ſuitable to the quality of the perſons who receive them. If it be a Father, our Devoir obliges us to have a care of him, and to comply with him in all things. If he reviles you, if he ſmite you, all muſt be ſupported with patience. But, will you haply ſay, my Father is a wicked Man? What matters it? That excuſe is not allowable. When Nature gave you a Father, ſhe was not engag'd to give you a good one. In like manner, when your Brother injures you, be not over intentive to what he does to you, but conſider the obligations of your own duty, and how you are to demean your ſelf towards him, that ſo you may do nothing but what is conformable to Nature. Thus will it come to paſs, that no Man will have the power to offend you, if you will it not, and

if

if any do you an injury, it proceeds only from this, that you imagine it done to you. Make the ſame judgment of all the reſt. You will come to underſtand what are the Devoirs of a Neighbour, of a Citizen, of a Military General, and of all others, if you accuſtom your ſelf to conſider what they are.

Know, that the principal point of Religion conſiſts in having right ſentiments of the Gods. As for inſtance, to believe they really are, that they govern the World, with goodneſs and juſtice, that they are to be obey'd, that men ought to acquieſs in what they do, and indiſputably follow their Orders, as proceeding from a moſt excellent and moſt accompliſh'd intelligence. For, thus principled, you will never charge them with ought, and you will not complain that they have deſerted you. But this is not a thing to be attempted, if you do not ſlight whatever is not dependent on you, and if you do not place all Good and all Evil, in that which abſolutely depends on you. *Sect.* 39.

For

For if you imagine, that any other thing is Good or Evil, it muſt needs come to paſs, that you will be often fruſtrated of what you wiſh, that you will fall into what you endeavour to ſhun, and that you will blame and have an averſion for thoſe, who have caus'd you that misfortune. Accordingly, as it is natural for all Animals to ſhun what is hurtful to them, and to have an averſion for all ſuch as are able to do them any miſchief; So have they the ſame propenſion, to embrace what is beneficial to them, and to cheriſh all thoſe who can do them any good. So that it is impoſſible, that a perſon who believes he hath receiv'd any damage, ſhould admit of a joynt-exultation with the other, who hath done it him, nor that the diſpleaſure he hath receiv'd ſhould give him any joy. Thence it comes that the Son ſometimes reviles his Father, becauſe he gives him not that which hath the denomination of Good amongſt Men. And this alſo was the occaſion of the War between *Eteocles* and *Polynices*; becauſe their imagination was fixt on this,

this, that Soveraignity was a Good. Thence it comes also, that the Husband-man, the Pilot, the Merchant, and those who loose their Wives, or their Children, speak injuriously of the Gods. Odinarily Piety and Profit meet together. From that reason does it proceed, that he who is careful not to wish and shun any thing, but what he ought to shun, or wish, makes it his study at the same time to be a Pious and a Just man. Besides every Man is oblig'd to make his Oblations and Sacrifices according to the custom of the Country where he lives, with much Modesty, avoiding avarice and prodigality, and doing it also with all the purity, and all the diligence requisite thereto.

When you go to a Foreteller of things to come, no doubt, but you are ignorant of what is to happen. For it is, to be inform'd by him, that you consult him. But, to know whether that which shall happen will be good or bad, you have no need of the Foreteller, because you know *Sect.* 40.

it

it already, if you are a Philosopher. For if it be not something dependent on your self, as it must necessarily be, since you are not ignorant of the success of it, you may confidently affirm, that it is neither good nor bad. When therefore you go to consult the Fortune-teller, be not prepossess'd with either Desire or Aversion; otherwise you will never approach him without trembling. Hold it for a Maxime, that every Event is indifferent, that it can never give any obstruction to what you had purposed to do, and, whatever it may be, that it is always in your power to apply it to a good use. Approach the Gods therefore with a resolute and assured mind, and look on them as such as are able to give you good counsels. When they have return'd you any answer, follow it exactly. Consider who they are whom you have consulted, and that you cannot forbear obeying them without a contempt of their power and incurring their displeasure. The things, about which we are to consult the Oracle, are those, as *Socrates* affirm'd, the

the whole consideration whereof is attributed purely to hazard, and which cannot be foreseen, either by Reason, or any other Art whatsoever. So that when the question is concerning the defence of your Country, or of your Friend, there is no necessity of going to the South-sayer; inasmuch as if the South-sayer tell you, that the entrails of the Victime presage ill success, it is an infallible sign, either that you will dye, or that you will be crippled, or that you will be banish'd, which might haply divert you from the design you were engag'd in. In the mean time Reason advises, that you should relieve your Friend and Country, even with the hazard of your Life. Make your applications then to a greater Oracle. Go to the *Pythian* Priest, who drove out of the Temple a Man, who sometime before had wav'd relieving one of his Friends, then ready to be murther'd.

It is requisite that you prescribe to your self a certain course of Life, and a Law, to be inviolably observ'd by you, *Sect.* 41.

you, wherever you may be; whether your converſation be amongſt Men, or that you are privately retir'd from all company.

Sect. 42. Keep ſilence, as much as you can. Never ſpeak any thing but what is abſolutely neceſſary, and to do that, ſpend as few words as you can. When any occaſion of ſpeaking ſhall preſent it ſelf, amuſe not your ſelf in diſcourſing either of the Gladiators, or the Circean Exerciſes, or of the Olympick Games, or of eating, or of drinking, or of any of all thoſe impertinencies, which are the Subjects of moſt peoples Diſcourſes. But above all things, be careful, in your Converſation, to avoid both Praiſe and Diſpraiſe, and making Compariſons between any.

Sect. 43. When you are amongſt your Friends, if their communication be of any thing which is not decent, uſe all the endeavours you can to bring them to a change of Diſcourſe; and if you are amongſt perſons unacquainted with you, ſpeak not a word.

As

As to Laughter, let not yours be either too long, or too frequent, or too lould. Never ſwear, if you can poſſibly avoid it, and if you are forc'd thereto; do beforehand all that lies in your power, to be diſpens'd from it. *Sect.* 44.

Avoid the great Treatments of the People. If you are accidentally engag'd to be at any of them, make immediately a reflection on your ſelf, and be vigilant and circumſpect over your Actions, leaſt you inſenſibly participate of the demeanour of the People. For you are to know, that it is impoſſible, when your Companion is defiled, but that you muſt be defiled alſo, if you rub againſt him, though you were pure and clean before. *Sect.* 45.

Of all accommodations relating to the Body, as Meat, Drink, Cloathing, Houſes, Servants, take only ſo much as neceſſity requires, and the Mind ſtands in need of, in order to its well-being, and reject whatever contributes to Luxury and Delicacy. *Sect.* 46.

Sect. 47. Endeavour all you can to abſtain from the pleaſure of Women till you are Married. And when you have got one, uſe her honourably, and as the Law preſcribes. But though you come into that courſe of Life, think not you have any cauſe to make any oſtentation of it, and to reprehend thoſe who live otherwiſe.

Sect. 48. If it be told you, that ſome body hath ſpoken evil of you, amuſe not your ſelf to refute what he hath ſaid; only make anſwer, that he knows not all your vices, and that he would have ſaid much more, if he had been acquainted therewith.

Sect. 49. There is no neceſſity of frequenting Theaters. But when occaſion requires your going thither, let your demeanour there be ſuch, as may diſcover you have no deſign to pleaſe any but your ſelf: That is, that you wiſh things may be done as they are, and that he ſhould gain the Victory who really deſerves it. For by that means all will fall out as you would have it, and you will not be mov'd

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at any occurrence. Above all things, refrain from the clamours, ſatisfactions, and ſurpriſes of the People. When you are come away thence, amuſe not your ſelf in diſcourſing of what had paſs'd there. Of that there is no advantage, nor does it any way contribute to your improvement. If you do otherwiſe, you will make it appear that you were an admirer of the Show, and that you are fallen into the ſame paſſions, which are obſervable in the meaner ſort of People.

Frequent not the Lectures of Poets and Orators. When your preſence is deſired at any of them, do all you can, to be exempted. But when you are there, be ſure to demean your ſelf with a decent Gravity. Let there be a certain ſtayedneſs and conſtancy in your actions. And above all, be it your care, to avoid being importunate or troubleſome to any one. *Sect.* 50.

When you ſhall have ought to do with a Perſon of Quality, bethink *Sect.* 51.

your ſelf, before you undertake any thing, what *Socrates* or *Zeno* would have done, upon the like occaſion. If you obſerve that rule, queſtion not but what you ſhall do will be rational.

Sect. 52. When you are to go to ſpeak with ſome great Lord, imagine to your ſelf, that you will not meet with him at home, or that he will not be ſpoken withall, or that the doors will not be open'd to you, or that he will ſlight you. But if, notwithſtanding all this, there be a neceſſity of your going to him, it is conſequently requiſite, that you patiently endure whatever will happen, that you murmure not in your ſelfe, and, in fine, that you ſay not, *This man hath the carriage of a great Lord.* This is a popular kind of expreſſion, and fit only for Perſons minding only external things.

Sect. 53. When you are in Company, let not your diſcourſe run upon your own commendable Actions, nor the hazards you have been engaged in. You

You are not to imagine, that others ſhould take a pleaſure, in hearing you talk, equal to the ſatisfaction you conceive in ſpeaking to them.

Never make it your buſineſs to find *Sect.* 54. others occaſion of Laughter. For beſides that it is the right way of falling into popular behaviour, it abates much of the eſteeme and reſpect which might otherwiſe be had for you.

It is dangerous diſcourſing of things *Sect.* 55. that are not decent. When therefore any thing of that kind is advanced in your preſence, you ought, if you think it convenient and have the opportunity, to reprove the raiſer of ſuch a diſcourſe, or at leaſt aſſure him by your ſilence or the bluſhing of your countenance, that you take no pleaſure in any communication of that nature.

If you conceive the Idæa of ſome *Sect.* 56. pleaſure, it is expected you ſhould, upon that emergency, retaine the ſame moderation which you expreſs

in other things. Let it be your first care, that you be not carried away with that Idæa. Examine it in your self, and take the leisure to make your reflections on it. Then consider the difference there is between the time, during which you have the satisfaction of that pleasure, and that wherein, after your satisfaction therein, you will repent you of it, and find fault with your self for so doing. Oppose also thereto, the satisfaction it will be to you, if you abstain from it. But though you might enjoy these sorts of pleasure without any self-reproach, yet should you not absolutely resigne your self thereto, nor suffer your self to be overcome by the caresses, the charms, and insinuations, which are the ordinary attendants of Voluptuousness. Bethink your self that the internal joy which you will receive upon the gaining of such a *Victory*, is somewhat that is much more excellent than any thing of that kind.

Sect. 57. When you are once fully resolved to do any thing, fear not to be seen in it, even though the People were ready

ready to make the worſt conſtructions of it. For if what you do be a Good, you are to deſie all apprehenſions, ſince you cannot be reprov'd without injuſtice. But, on the contrary, if it be an Evil, you ought not onely to avoyd being ſeen, but you are alſo obliged to deſiſt from your enrerpriſe.

As theſe words, *It is day, It is night.* are moſt certain and true, if you divide them by the disjunctive particle * *Or*; and are abſolutely falſe, if you knit them together with the conjunctive particle † *And*: So when you are at a Feaſt, and that you take a pleaſure in the beſt Meſſes that are brought to the Table, if you particularly regard your body, you do ſomewhat that is moſt excellent for your body. If you alſo conſider the community and equality, which ought to be obſerved amongſt the Gueſts, you do a very undecent action. When therefore any one invites you to Dinner, you ought not onely to regard your appetite, and what you love beſt, but you are further obliged, to expreſs a certain

Sect. 58.

* *As, it is day, or it is night.*

† *It is day, and it is night.*

This place is a Rock, from which I have got off as well as I could. I muſt confeſs, this Comparison is ſomewhat ſtrange; but it is to be Imputed to Epictetus.

deference and respect towards the person by whom you are treated.

Sect. 59. If you undertake any Employment which is above your abilities, besides the hazard of your coming off with discredit, it will occasion your negligence of some other, whereof you might have acquitted your selfe perfectly well.

Sect. 60. When you walk, you are careful enough to avoyd treading on the which may happen to be in your way. So ought you, in Life, to be no lesse cautious, that the superiour part of your soul be not injur'd by any bruitish Passions, or false Opinions. For you will with much greater facility compass your designs, if you observe this Maxime in whatever you undertake.

Sect. 61. The body ought to be the standard of Wealth, as the Foot is the measure of the Shooe. Observe this rule well, and you will never be at any great distance from Mediocrity, nor the limits prescrib'd thereby. If you neglect

neglect it, you will unquestionably tumble down the precipice. For as, when you have once had the curiosity of getting Shoos after the newest fashion, and such as exceed the measure of your Feet, you will afterwards be of an humour to have them gilt, and then to have them of Purple, or embroider'd, with much cost and workmanship: So in the business of wealth, when you have once exceeded the limits of Mediocrity, there is then no stinting of you, but you are insensibly transported into all manner of Luxury and Excess.

As soon as young Mayds are arrived to the age of fourteen years, Men begin to call them their Mistresses. This raising an apprehension in them, that Nature hath disposed them into the World for them, and that it must be their endeavour to humour them, they thereupon make it their maine business to dress and trick up themselves, and place all their expectations in their ornaments. It is therefore requisite they should be brought to apprehend, that these honours and civilities *Sect.* 62.

civilities are rendred them, onely upon the account of their Modesty, Discretion, and respectful Carriage.

Sect. 63. To be over much addicted to Corporeal things is ever the argument of a mean Soul. As for instance, to be assiduous in Exercises, to drink and eat much, to be excessively addicted to Women, and to spend too much time in the other functions of the body. All this is to be done as it were in haste, and without any great attention; all our earnest cares we are to reserve for the Mind.

Sect. 64. When any one injures you by word or deed, remember, that he would not have done so, if he had not had an imagination that he ought to have done it. Do you think he could quit his own sentiment to follow yours? If he does not make a sound judgment of things, and be accordingly mistaken, he suffers the trouble and prejudice arising thereby. When a man judges that a true Thing is false, because it is obscure and immers'd in dark-

darkneſs, this judgment injures not the truth. He who makes ſuch a judgment injures none but himſelf. If you follow this Maxime, when any one ſhall revile you, you will patiently endure it; For you will always ſay in your ſelfe, this Man thinks that what he does is well done.

Every thing hath two faces, where- *Sect.* 65.
of one is ſupportable, the other in ſupportable. For example, when your Brother injures, look not on him as he is injurious to you. For what he does, if it be ſo taken, cannot be indured. Conſider him rather as he is your Brother, with whom you have had a joynt-education. And ſo you will take it after another manner, which may render his action ſupportable.

Theſe kinds of Propoſitions are *Sect.* 66.
not conſequent one to the other; *I am wealthier than you are, therefore, I am the honeſter man. I am more eloquent than you are, therefore I am the more virtuous man. But theſe Arguments are good: I am wealthier than*

you

you are, therefore my wealth is more considerable than yours. I am more eloquent than you are, therefore my way of ſpeaking is more excellent than yours. So that this ſhould give you very little trouble, ſince eloquence and wealth ought not to be the object of your care.

Sect. 67. If you meet with any one in the Bath, who hath ſoon done waſhing himſelfe, ſay not that he waſhes not himſelfe well, but ſay that he makes much haſt to waſh himſelfe. In like manner, if any one drink much, ſay not that he does ill in drinking at that rate, but ſay ſimply, that he drinks much. For, how came you to underſtand that he did ill, that you ſhould paſs ſuch a Judgment of him? If you are thus reſerv'd in your ſentiments you ſhall penetrate into the thoughts of another, and your thoughts ſhall be conformable to thoſe of others.

Sect. 68. What place or company ſoever you are in, never ſay that you are a Philoſopher, and amuſe not your ſelfe in declaring before Ignorant Perſons

Perſons what Maximes you follow. Do you only performe what they enjoyne you. When a man is at a Feaſt. it is not ſeaſonable to talk of the Manner of eating decently. He muſt eat decently without ſpeaking of it. *Socrates* was a perſon, who was never guilty of any Oſtentation. Nor ever was there any perſon that ſupported it from others with ſo much conſtancy. When ſome out of meer contempt of him and his doctrine, came and intreated him to conduct them to ſome other Philoſophers, and to give them his recommendation to them; ſo far was he from giving them any repulſe, that, with much civility, he went along with them to thoſe other Philoſophers. So little was he troubled, that the Doctrine of others ſhould be prefer'd before his own. If it happen then that any one ſpeak of ſome Axiome of Philoſophy before ignorant perſons, be you ſilent as long as you can, in regard it is ſomewhat to be fear'd, that you may caſt up what you have not yet well digeſted. If any one reproach you with Ignorance, and you are not any way mov'd

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at it, know that you have already attain'd ſome part of what your precepts enjoyn you. Sheep do not vomit up the Food or Graſs they have eaten, but, in requital, are thereby fatted up, and ſupply their Owners with Milk and Wooll. In like manner ought not you to amuſe your ſelf in entertaining ignorant perſons with your Precepts, becauſe it is a ſign you have not well digeſted them. They are rather to be inſtructed by your Actions.

Sect. 69. If you have learnt to ſatisfie your body with little, forbear making any oſtentation of it. If you have brought your ſelfe to a cuſtome of drinking onely water, think not that you are to boaſt of it. And if you would ſometimes exerciſe your ſelfe in a thing requiring much pains and labour, do it privately, and be not deſirous that others ſhould ſee you, in imitation of thoſe, who being perſecuted by perſons of authority, run and imbrace Statues,

I here follow the ſenſe of *Simplicius*, yet doubt whether it be that of *Epictetus*. I think *Epictetus* would only ſay, *That a man ſhould not amuſe himſelf to go and imbrace Statues in the midſt of Winter, to be admired by the People*, as *Diogenes* the *Cynick* did, as *Laertius* affirms.

tues, to get the people together, and in that posture cry out, that they have suffered violence. Whoever seeks glory by such means seeks onely the outside of it, and looses the fruit both of Patience and Frugality; inasmuch as he places the end of these excellent vertues in the opinion of the multitude. Certainly, all Affectation in this particular is frivolous and of no advantage. If you would accustome your selfe to Patience, take fair water into your mouth, when you are extreamly thirsty, and having spurted it out immediately, without swallowing so much as one drop, tell not any body of it.

It argues a meanness of spirit and ignorance in any man, never to expect Good or Evill from himself; but to expect it always from some thing not dependent on him. On the contrary, it is the characteristick of a Philosopher, not to expect his Good or Evil, but from himself. *Sect.* 70.

The signs whereby it may be known whether a man makes any proficiency in *Sect.* 71.

in ſtudy and vertue, are theſe, Not to reprove, not to commend, not to blame, and not to accuſe any one, not to boaſt of what he is, or what he knows; to be his owne accuſer, when he is hindred or forbidden to do ſomething, to laugh in his ſleeve at thoſe perſons who commend him; not to be angry when any find fault with him; but to imitate thoſe, who having not perfectly recover'd their health, walk gently for fear of ſtirring the humours; to have an abſolute power over his deſires; not to have any averſion but for what is repugnant to the nature of thoſe things which depend on him; not to wiſh any thing paſſionately; not to be concern'd whether he be accounted an Ignorant or a Knowing perſon; in fine, to be diſtruſtful of himſelfe, as of a domeſtick Enemy, whoſe ambuſhes he is always afraid of.

Sect. 72. When any one makes it his brag, that he can explicate the Books of *Chryſippus*, let this be your reflection, that if *Chryſippus* had not written obſcurely, this other perſon had had nothing

thing to brag of. Yet is not this that which I ſeek after, my deſigne is to ſtudy Nature, and to follow Her. When I am told then, that *Chryſippus* is her interpreter, my recourſe is to him, and if I underſtand him not, I ſeek out ſome other body that can explicate him to me. Hitherto have I not done any thing that is excellent or commendable. For, when I ſhall have met with any one that is able to explicate that Philoſopher to me, yet the main thing is yet unpreſs'd, which is, the putting of his Precepts into practice. If I make no further progreſs than to admire the explication of *Chryſippus*, all amounts only to this, that where I was a *Philoſopher* before, I am now become a *Grammarian*. All the difference is, that, inſtead of *Homer*, I explicate *Chryſippus*. And thence it muſt come, that I am much more aſham'd I cannot do actions ſuitable to his Precepts, then I am at my not underſtanding of him.

OBSERVE what we have deliver'd as inviolable Lawes, which you can- *Sect.* 73.

not transgress without impiety; and trouble not your selfe, concerning all that might have been said; since that depends not on you.

Sect. 74. How long will you defferre applying your self to such excellent things, and putting in practice such important instructions? When will you give over violating the Lawes of right reason? you have heard the Precepts which you ought to embrace, and I am inclin'd to believe, that you have already embraced them; but give others some assurance of it. What other Master do you yet expect, till whose coming you deferre your reformation? Bethink your selfe, that your youth is past, and that you are come to the age of a man. If you neglect these Precepts, and if you make them not your Directories of your Manners, you will put it off from day to day, and from time to time make additional and reiterated resolutions, and so your life will slide away so insensibly as that it will not be perceivable, whether you have made any progress in the study of

of Vertue or not. In fine, your life and your death will not be distinguishable from that of the meaneſt perſon among the Populace. Now therefore, without any further delay, embrace the life of a man aiming at proficiency and perfection. Look upon whatever ſeems beſt to you, as an intrangreſſible Law. If any thing laborious, if any thing delightful, if any thing glorious, if any thing disgraſeful preſents it ſelfe, remember it is time to enter the liſts in order to an engagement, that the Olimpick Exerciſes are come, and that there is no thinking of any retreat. Bethink your ſelfe, that your Eſtabliſhment is concern'd in either the looſing or gaining of the Victory. By this meanes was it that *Socrates* came to that point of Wiſdome which was juſtly attributed to him, by preſenting himſelf to all occaſions, and not harkning to any advice but that of Reaſon. For your part then who are not yet a *Socrates*, you ought to live as a man deſirous of becoming as wiſe as *Socrates*.

Sect. 75. The chiefeſt, and moſt neceſſary part of Philoſophy is that which treats of the uſe of the Precepts, for example, *Not to lye.* The ſecond, that which treats of Demonſtration; for example, *Of the reaſon why men ought not to lye.* And the third is that which confirmes and examines the two other parts; for example, it ſhews, why ſuch a thing is Demonſtration. It teaches alſo, what Demonſtration is, what, Conſequence, Diſpute, Verity, Falſity, and all the reſt. The third part is neceſſary for the ſecond, and the ſecond is ſo for the Firſt. But the Firſt, as I have already ſaid, is the moſt neceſſary of all, and therefore that is the part whereunto a man is particularly to apply himſelfe. And yet our courſe is quite otherwiſe. We only ſtick to the third part, we ſpend all our Study and Time therein, and we abſolutely neglect the Firſt. Thence it comes that we fall ſhort, when we are to prove by ſound Demonſtrations, that men ought not to lie; and yet we cannot forbeare lying dayly and hourely.

At

At the beginning of all your enterprises have these words always in your mouth? *Sect.* 76.

Guid me, great Jove, to th' period of my Fate?
That curs'd Cruc I will not imitate,
Whose Vanity and Insolence defy
Thy sacred Lawes and thy Authority.
But their seduc'd presumtion fruitless growes,
Thy soveraign Power nothing can oppose:
A sudden check of Deil'ny undermines
The Impious man, and all his lewd designes.

You will sometimes also have occasion to say these words. *Sect.* 77.

Who can, with what's not to be shun'd comply,
Surveies the secrets of the Deity.

But, above all, be mindful of these excellent and admirable words, spoken by *Socrates* to his Friend *Crito*, during his imprisonment. *Sect.* 78.

If the Great Gods, dear Friend, have minuted
The dreadful Tempest which hangs o're my head,
If, of my Death, the dire Decree be sign'd,
I acquiesce, with a submissive mind.
I, of my Life, would not prolong the date,

Anitus and Melitus.

Beyond the ſtinted limits of my Fate:
Of my few dayes, my Enemies diſpoſe,
'Tis in their Power their haſty courſe to cloſe:
To that my Body, mortal, weeds muſt bend,
But ſtill my mind their malice does tranſcend:
And though I, to their Rage, a Victim fall,
My Faith and Vertue know no Funeral.

FINIS.

THE TABLET OF CEBES OR, THE EMBLEME OF HUMANE LIFE.

Juv. Sat. 1.

Quicquid agunt Homines, Votum, Timor, Ira, Voluptas,
Gaudia, Discursus, nostri est farrago Libelli.

ADVERTISEMENT.

TO *This little Abbridgment of the Philoſophy of* Epictetus, *I have added the* Tablet, *or* Embleme *of* Humane Life, *attributed to* Cebes, *in regard they are two Maſter-pieces of Antiquity, which cuſtome hath rendred in a manner inſeparable. This latter is an excellent draught of Humane Life, done by one of the moſt expert Maſters that ever were. This Philoſopher liv'd four hundred and ſixty years, or thereabouts before the Birth of our Saviour. He was born*

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at Thebes, *in* Beotia, *and the Diſciple of* Socrates. Diogenes Laertius *affirms, that he writ three Dialogues, two whereof are loſt. So that we have remaining but only this, which he entituled the* Tablet *or Repreſentation of Humane Life. Yet are there ſome Criticks, as* Wolfius, *who affirm it is not his, becauſe there is mention made in it of* Plato, *who liv'd at the ſame time. But this conjecture is groundleſs, inaſmuch as it would follow by the ſame reaſon, that* Plato *muſt not have made the Dialogue of the* Immortality of the Soul, *ſince mention is made there*

there of Cebes. *Howere it be, thus far we are certain, that this is a moſt excellent and moſt ancient Piece. For* Tertullian *obſerves, that* Tertullian *the Lawyer his Kinſman, publiſh'd an explication of it. The general reputation it hath continu'd in, for the ſpace of twenty Ages, that it hath been in the World, hath been ſo extraordinary, that it hath been tranſlated into moſt Languages. It hath been my fortune to have met with fifteen different Verſions in the Latine tongue.* Velſius, Odaxius, Wolfius *and* Caſelius, *have taken moſt pains about this Work, but*

but particularly Velſius. *For he hath writ a large Commentary upon this* Tablet, *containing in a manner all the Moral Philoſophy of the* Platoniſts. Maſcardi *rendred it into the* Italian, *and* Salmaſius *hath ſome time ſince given us an ancient* Arabian *Paraphraſe of it, and a Latine Verſion of* John Elichman, *one of the moſt knowing Perſons of his Age in the Oriental Tongues. But the Author of that Paraphraſe hath committed a ſtrange fault, and ſuch as I think conſiderable enough not to be omitted here. He imagin'd, that the Ancient man, who makes*

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an explication of this Tablet *or Repreſentation, was called* Hercules ; *upon no other ground, than that* Cebes, *cries out in ſome places,* O Hercules ; *which is only an exclamation ordinary amongſt the* Greeks *and* Latines, *when they were ſurpriz'd at any thing. Nothing more common in our Books.*

For the better direction of the Reader, and greater eaſe of his Memory, there is at the end of this little Book, a piece of Sculpture, exhibiting the Embleme *it ſelf, and a ſhort Explication, by way of Figures,*

in

in the Cut, answerable to others in the Leaf next adjoyning thereto, that the Description of it might be the more familiar.

CEBES'S

THE EXPLICATION Of the TABLE.

1 THE Gate of the Incloſure of Humane Life.
2 Genius.
3 Impoſture.
4 Opinions, Appetites and Pleaſures.
5 Fortune.
6 The Inconſiderate.
7 Incontinence, Luxury, Rapine, and Flattery.
8 Laborioufneſs.
9 Sadneſs.
10 Miſery.
11 Mourning.
12 Rage.
13 The Houſe of Misfortune.
14 Repentance.
15 True Opinion.
16 False Opinion.
17 False Doctrine.
18 Poets, Orators, Geometritians, &c.
19 Incontinence, Luxury, and Opinion.
20 The way to true Doctrine.
21 Continence and Patience.
22 True Doctrine.
23 Truth and Perſuaſion.
24 Science and the Vertues.
25 Felicity.
26 The firſt pleaſure of the Wiſe Man.
27 The Cowardly, who have loſt courage.

CEBES'S TABLET,

OR, THE EMBLEME OF HUMANE LIFE.

AS we were walking in the Temple of *Saturn*, and viewing the several Presents which had been offer'd there, among other things, we took particular notice, at the entrance of it, of a certain Draught, or Picture, very remark-

able, as well for the Manner of it, as the Subject. We could not imagine what it might be, nor of what Antiquity. For though what was repreſented therein had in ſome meaſure the reſemblance of a City, or a Camp, yet was it not indeed either of the two. It was a great Encloſure, within which there were two other Encloſures, whereof one was larger than the other. Near the Gate leading into the firſt, there were ſeveral Perſons drawn, and within it might be obſerv'd an aſſembly of Women. But at the entrance might be ſeen an ancient Man ſtanding, drawn in the poſture of one, who ſeem'd to have ſome directions to give thoſe who entred into the Encloſure.

After we had a long time taken a proſpect of that Emblematical Repreſentation, and were at a loſs, what to think of it, there happen'd to be ſtanding by us a very ancient Man, whoſe curioſity had engag'd him upon the Survey of that Piece, as ours had us. This good Man had well

well obſerv'd all our Actions, and thereupon addreſs'd himſelf to us in this Diſcourſe.

It is no wonder, my Friends, if you find it ſo hard a matter to gueſs at the explication of that Picture. There are few perſons, even of this Country, who know the meaning of it. This Preſent was not made by any of the Inhabitants of this City A ſtranger, came heretofore into this Country, a perſon no leſs recommendable for the excellency of his Apprehenſion, than for his deep Wiſdome. That man, in all his words and in all his actions imitated the courſe of life of *Pythagoras* and *Parmenides*. He it was who dedicated this Temple, and that Emblematical Picture to *Saturn*.

I ask'd him, whether he had any acquaintance with that Perſon. Yea, ſaid he, I have been an admirer of him a long time. For though he were but a young Man, yet could he diſcourſe of all things very pertinently. I have heard him oftentimes

discourſing upon the ſubject of this Picture. I intreat you, as you love the immortal Gods, Cry'd I, to give us an explication of it, if your convenience will permit it. You will infinitely oblige us, for we are extreamly deſirous to know what it ſignifies. With all my heart ſaid he. But it is neceſſary, that I give you an Advertiſement before-hand, of the danger whereto you expoſe your ſelves. For if, when I ſhall have related theſe things to you, you perfectly comprehend them, you will become Wiſe and Happy; if not, you will be ignorant and ſtupid, and you will lead a wicked and a wretched Life. This Embleme hath ſome correſpondence with that which was propoſed by * *Sphinx*; whoever could not explicate what ſhe ſaid was by her put to death: On the contrary, ſhe ſav'd his life, who found out the explication of it. The ſame thing is to be affirm'd of this Picture. For Extravagance is like a *Sphinx* among Men, obſcurely propoſing what is good, bad, and indifferent. If any one be not able

A Sorcereſs who had the face of a young Maid, and in the reſt of her body reſembled a Lyon.

to

to diſcern them, ſhe kills him not immediately at a blow, as the *Sphinx* did; but ſhe treats him with greater cruelty. For ſhe puts him to death by degrees, as thoſe who are put upon the Rack. In like manner, if any one attains the knowledg of theſe things, beſides his clearing himſelf from that misfortune, Extravagance vaniſhes, and he is perfectly happy all the reſt of his days. I conjure you therefore, ſaid he, by the Love you bear your ſelves, to give your greateſt attention to what I am going to relate to you. Juſt Gods! cry'd I, what impatience have you rais'd in us, to be inform'd of theſe things, if they are ſuch as you repreſent them! Make no queſtion of it, replies he. I intreat you then, ſaid I to him, to deliver us out of this impatience, and to be aſſur'd, that we too much fear the danger wherewith you threaten us, and that we have alſo too high an eſteem for ſo noble a reward, to ſuffer the leaſt of your words to eſcape our attention.

Having thereupon taken a little walking-ſtick in his hand, and directing it to the Embleme, do you ſee, ſaid he, that large Enclosure? Yes, we do ſee it, ſaid we.

It is neceſſary, ſaid he, that you firſt know, that that Place is called *Life*, and that the perſons whom you ſee ſtanding there neer the Gate, are ſuch as are to enter into it. As to the Old Man, whom you ſee rais'd above all the others, holding a Paper in one hand, and making a ſign with the other, he is called *Genius*. He gives directions to thoſe who enter, what they ought to do, when they ſhall come into Life, and ſhews them the Way they are to take, in order to their happy being therein. I pray tell me, ſaid I, where is that Way, and what is to be done to come into it. Do you not perceive, ſaid he, that, towards the Gate, through which all thoſe perſons paſs, there is a Throne, on which there ſits a Woman, who is painted and ſeems to have many attractions to per-

perſwade? What you ſay is true, ſaid I; ſhe hath alſo a Cup in her hand. How do you call her?

She is called *Impoſture*, reply'd he, becauſe ſhe generally deceives all Men. What is her employment? It is, reply'd he, to preſent all thoſe who enter into *Life* with a certain Drink, whereby ſhe inebriates them with *Errour* and *Ignorance*.

What happens afterwards? As ſoon as they have taken of that Drink, they enter into *Life*, ſaid he.

Can none be exempted from taking of it? None. Only ſome drink more of it, others, leſs. Do you not ſee further, that, within the Gate, added the Old Man, there are certain Women, who ſeem to be highly engag'd in a mad debauch? If you obſerve them well, you will find they are in poſtures much different one from another. Thoſe are *Opinions*, *Concupiſcences*, and *Vo-*

Luptuouſneſs. Now when thoſe Perſons of whom I have ſpoken, come to enter into *Life*, thoſe Women are tranſported with joy, they embrace them with the greateſt kindneſs imaginable, and prevail ſo far as to draw them to them. And whether do they conduct them? They conduct Some to the Port of ſafety, and others, to Precipices. Which Fate attends them, becauſe they were poiſon'd by *Impoſture*.

That is a very ſtrange Drink that you tell us of, reply'd I. That is not all, added he. For though they promiſe all, that they will conduct them to happy Life, and furniſh them with the means of attaining it, yet many ſuffer themſelves to be miſled out of the right way, and inconſiderately run of all ſides, by reaſon of the *Errour* and *Ignorance*, they have taken, at their entrance into *Life*.

Inform me, I pray, who is that Woman exalted upon a Ball? ſhe ſeems to be blind, and diſtracted.

You

You are in the right, reply'd he. Her name is *Fortune*, ſhe is not only blind, but ſhe is alſo deaf, and mad. She runs up and down, takes away from one, gives to another, And it will not be long after ſhe hath beſtow'd ſomething on this Man, ere ſhe gets it away again, and diſpoſes it into other hands. Whatever ſhe does diſcovers her temerity and inconſtancy. Accordingly, her humour is extreamly well repreſented to us by the poſture ſhe is in. For if ſhe be plac'd upon a Ball, it is to ſhew, that there is not any aſſurance in the preſents ſhe makes us, and that there needs but a ſmall matter to ruine him, who puts any confidence in her.

Thoſe whom you ſee ſtanding by her, and endeavouring to catch what ſhe caſts away, are called the *Inconſiderate*. Why, ſaid I, are they ſo different one from another? ſome of them, ſeem to be tranſported with gladneſs, and others, to be in a dreadful deſpair?

Thoſe,

Thoſe, ſaid he, whom you ſee ſo jocund, are the Perſons, who have received ſome favour from *Fortune*, and thence it comes, that they honour her with the name of *Good Fortune*. Thoſe, on the contrary, who are ſo dejected, and ſtretch out their Arms, repreſent the Perſons from whom ſhe hath taken away what ſhe had given them, and accordingly they call her *Ill Fortune*. What preſents, reply'd I, can ſhe make them, that they ſhould be ſo jocund, after the receipt thereof, and what can ſhe take away from the others, that ſhould put them into ſo great a Conſternation? It is that, reply'd he, which we ordinarily imagine to be the true Goods, as *Wealth*, *Reputation*, *Nobility*, *Children*, *Soveraignty*, *Kingdoms*, and all the other things of that nature. But we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak of them elſewhere. Let us now go on with the explication of our Picture.

Do you not obſerve, that when ſome have paſt that Gate, there is above

bove it another Enclosure, beyond which there are certain Women, who may be noted by their dresses to be of ill demeanour? I observe them very well, reply'd I.

Those, said he, are named *Incontinence*, *Luxury*, *Rapine*, and *Flattery*. They are there set, as it were Sentinels, to take notice of those who have received any favour from *Fortune*, and when they can meet with any one, they are extreamly glad. They embrace him, and treat him with great kindness; they promise him a pleasant Life, and exempted from all kind of trouble and crosses. In fine, if they can persuade him, and if he once resigns himself up to pleasures, that Life is indeed delightfull to him for a time; but it will not be long after he hath tasted of its enjoyments, ere he will be of a contrary Opinion, and find nothing but bitterness in it, and when he begins to come to himself, he is too late convinc'd, that he hath not enjoy'd any true pleasure, that he hath ruin'd

ruin'd himself, and that people laugh at him. For when he hath squander'd away all that *Fortune* had bestow'd on him, he becomes a Slave to those Strumpets, and is reduc'd to a necessity of undertaking all sorts of wicked actions, even to those that are most prejudicial to himself, and such as hurry him to the precipice of destruction. As for example, to Steal, to commit Sacrilege by the robbing of Temples, to betray his best Friends, in a word, to commit all sorts of crimes and unrighteous Acts. In fine, when he is come to the height of his wickedness, he is deliver'd up into the hands of *Punishment*. Who is that Woman you speak of? Do you not perceive behind there, a little Door, and a narrow and very obscure Dungeon, at which may be seen the glimpse of certain Women that are nasty, and cover'd only with dirty rags and tatters? Yea, reply'd I, I do see them very well. She who hath a whip in her hand, saies the Old man, is called *Punishment*. She who hath her head bending

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ing down towards her knees, is *Sadneſs*. And the other, that tares her hair, is called *Miſery*. And for the deformed and dreadful-look'd-man, who ſtands neer thoſe Women, and who is lean and ſtark-naked, he is called *Mourning*. That other Woman, who is behind him, is his Siſter, named *Rage*, or *Deſpaire*. To theſe horrid Monſters is this miſerable man firſt deliver'd, that he may lead a Life with them, in Puniſhments and Torments. A while after, he is dragg'd into another Houſe, which is no leſs terrible than the former. It is that of *Misfortune*. There muſt he ſpend the remainder of his days, in perpetual calamities. What becomes of him at laſt, ſaid I? If it happen, reply'd he, that he makes his applications to *Repentance*, ſhe recovers him out of that unhappy condition, ſhe works a change in his opinion and will, and re-excites in him a deſire of applying himſelf to *True Doctrine*; though *Opinion* may afterwards conduct him ſometimes to *False Doctrine*. So that if he follow the

the *Opinion* which guides him to *True Doctrine*, she cleanses him of his former errors, and he becomes happy for the remainder of his days. But if on the contrary he be still seduc'd by *False Doctrine*, he will run the hazard of a relapse into his former sentiments, and return into the same condition, wherein he was before.

But who is that *False Doctrine* you speak of, said I? Do you not perceive that other Enclosure said he? I do, said I. On the outside of it, said he, towards the Gate there stands a Woman advantageously dress'd, yet seems to betray something of modesty. She it is whom the greatest part of Men, and particularly those who are excellent for their internal Endowments, call *Doctrine*, though she never was such, and that that name is falsely attributed to her. And yet those who are desirous to be happy, and come to *True Doctrine*, do first take their way to her. Not but that there is another Way, but that this

this is the more ordinary. As to the Men, whom you see walking in that Enclosure, they are the followers of that *False Doctrine*, who are seduced and deceived with an imagination of her being the *True Doctrine*. They are known by the names of *Poets*, *Orators*, *Logicians*, *Musicians*, *Arithmeticians*, *Geometricians*, *Astrologers*, *Epicureans*, *Peripateticks*, *Criticks*, and all the others, of that qualification.

Who are those Women, who seem to run to and fro, and with whom you said a while since that *Inconsinence* was? How come they within that second Enclosure? you are not mistaken, reply'd he; they are indeed the very same. They sometimes advance so farr. But they come not thither so oft as they do within the first Enclosure. Nay sometimes *Opinions* get in there. For those whom you see there have still within them some remainders of the Drink which *Imposture* had presented them withall. They are still attended by *Ignorance* and *Extravagance*, and

and they will never quit those inconsiderate Opinions, and will not be disengag'd from those other vicious inclinations, till such time as having forsaken that *False Doctrine*, they enter into the way of *True Science*, to take an Antidote, for the disburthening themselves of all their evil *Opinions*, and the dispelling of their *Ignorance*, and the other vices wherewith they are infected. For as long as they shall continue in false Opinion, they will never be able to recover their Liberty, nor oppose the least evil, by the means of those sorts of Sciences. I pray tell me, where is the Way which conducts men to *True Doctrine*. Do you perceive, said he, at the top of the Mount, a certain place, which is desert, and not inhabited. Very well answer'd I. You see also, continu'd he, a little Gate, before which there is a Way, wherein there are few persons to be met, because it seems to be inaccessible, by reason of its cragginess and difficulty of ascent? I see all that, said I; you are much in the right when

when you say that way is very hardly passable. If you look very narrowly, a litle beyond it, there is an extraordinay high Hill, whereof the way is very narrow, and come pass'd of all sides with precipices? Very true.

You are to know, that that is the Way which conducts to *True Doctrine*, and is, as you may observe, very hard to be discover'd. But do you consider also, that, upon that Hill, there is a great and high Rock, very steepy all about, on which there are two Women, strong and robust, which stretch out their Arms to all? I see them very well, how are they called? One is called *Continence*; the other, *Patience*. They are Sisters. The reason of their stretching forth their hands so willingly to such persons as present themselves, is to exhort those who are in their Way to take heart, and not to put a check to their progress, out of any discouragement; and it is also to advertise them, that they have not long to suffer,

ere they come into the right way.

I would fain know, when with much difficulty they have got to that Rock, how they will be able to aſcend any higher; for I can perceive no path, nor tract in which they may go? Thoſe two Women, reply'd he, come down from the top of the Rock towards them, and draw them up, where they give them the convenience to reſt themſelves, and take their breath. Then they give them courage and new ſtrength, and promiſe them that they will be their guides to bring them to *True Doctrine*. In fine they ſhew them, that the way to her is pleaſant, eaſy, and free from all misfortune.

But, added he, do you perceive, near that little Copſe of Wood, a Place, which is no leſs divertive, as well by reaſon of the great lightſomeneſs of it, as for that it repreſents a delightful Meadow? You ſee alſo in the middle, another En-

Enclosure, and another Gate? It is very right, reply'd I. That place is called the *Seat* and *Mansion* of the *Blessed*. It is there the *Vertues* and *Felicity* have establish'd their Throne.

O how pleasant does that place seem to be! cry'd I. Do you not farther observe, said he, that towards the Gate, there is a Woman very modestly clad, of a grave look, and who yet is extreamly beautiful, though she be well advanc'd in years? she is not made standing on a Ball, as *Fortune* is; on the contrary, she sits down upon a square stone, which is firm and immoveable. On both sides of her are two Women, who in likelyhood are her Daughters. What you say is true. She in the midst, reply'd he, is *True Doctrine*, and the two others are named *Truth* and *Persuasion*. She is seated on a square stone, to shew Travellers, that the way which leads to her is firm, and secure, and to raise in those, who receive any presents from her hands,

an apprehenſion that her gifts are as certain as thoſe of *Fortune* are unconſtant, and that they ſhall never be diſturbed in the enjoyment of their Goods. What is ſhe able to give? Aſſurance and quiet in their poſſeſſions reply'd he. But what is the excellency of thoſe Preſents? They have the vertue of aſſuring Men, that there ſhall not happen to them the leaſt diſſatisfaction in Life. O ye juſt Gods! what attractive gifts are theſe? But how comes it, ſaid I, that *True Doctrine* is ſet without the Encloſure? It is to cure thoſe who come to her, and to adminiſter to them a certain Medicine, to the end that, being purged, ſhe may conduct them to the *Vertues*. How can that be done reply'd I? I do not comprehend what you ſay. You will comprehend it within a ſhort time, reply'd he. The caſe here is the ſame as with a man caſt down by a great ſickneſs, whom they are conducting to a Phyſician. Firſt of all the Phyſitian makes uſe of Purgatives, whereby all the ill humours he hath in the Body may be diſ-

log'd;

log'd; then he reſtores him by degrees to his ſtrength, and in fine recovers him to his former health. But if the ſick perſon will not obey him, no wonder if he relapſe into the violence of his Diſeaſe.

'Tis enough, anſwer'd I, what your meaning is, I now fully underſtand. In like manner, continu'd he; if any one put himſelf into the hands of *True Doctrine*; ſhe treats him, and gives him of a drink, whereby ſhe communicates her Vertue to him, that, being purged, and having disburthen'd himſelf of all that was evil, as for inſtance, the *Ignorance* and *Errour* he had taken of *Impoſture*, and all other Vices, wherewith he had been fill'd in the firſt Encloſure, as *Arrogance*, *Avarice*, *Wrath*, *Covetuouſneſs*, and *Incontinence*, ſhe may bring him to *Science*, and the other *Vertues*. Who are thoſe Women, ſaid I?

What, said he, do you not see, reply'd he, that within that Gate, there is a company of fair Ladies, very plainly cloath'd, and yet have all the attractions and all the modesty could be wish'd in them? I see them very well, reply'd I; but I pray tell me their names. The chiefest of them is *Science*; her other Sisters are *Fortitude*, *Justice*, *Integrity*, *Temperance*, *Modesty*, *Liberality*, *Continence*, and *Meekness*, beautiful Ladies indeed! cry'd I. What hopes ought we now to conceive? You may hope any thing, added he, if, perfectly comprehending what I have said, you confirm it by your practise.

We shall endeavour it to the utmost of our power, reply'd I. Which if you do, answer'd he, you will be assuredly happy.

But when they have taken this man into their protection, what becomes of him? Whither do they dispose of him? They conduct him to their Mother, who is named *Felicity*.

licity. Do you obſerve the Way leading up to the Mountain, which is as it were a Cittadel in the midſt of the other Encloſures? Do you alſo take notice, that at the entrance of it there is a very beautiful Woman, ſeated on a Throne, very neatly clad, yet without affectation, and Crown'd with Flowers? I ſee her. Know then that ſhe repreſents *Felicity*, reply'd he? Now when any one comes up to the place of her aboad, ſhe and all the other Vertues Crown him, as they do thoſe who have gain'd great Victories. What Battailes hath he gain'd for that, ſaid I? Very great ones, reply'd he. He hath ſurmounted, and quell'd the dreadful Monſters, which did him a thouſand miſchiefs, and brought him into ſlavery. But thoſe noble Victories have made him Maſter of himſelf, and thoſe very Monſters, whom he obey'd before, are now become his ſlaves. What Monſters are thoſe? Firſt, *Errour* and *Ignorance*. What do you not think that they are Monſters? I do, reply'd I, and very dreadful

ones. Next, reply'd he, there are *Grief*, *Sadneſs*, *Avarice*, *Incontinence*, and all the other Vices of that kind. Then hath he an abſolute power over them, and does not obey them, as he did before. O illuſtrious Actions! O remarkable Victory! But, I pray, tell me, what Vertue hath that Crown wherewith he is adorn'd? O my dear Friend, replies the Old Man, how powerful is that Crown? He who is once adorn'd therewith becomes perfectly happy, and grounds not his hopes upon the happineſs of another. They are ſetled in himſelf. O the noble way of conquering, cry'd I! But when he is Crown'd, what does he? or whether goes he?

The Vertues bring him back to the place whence he came, and make him ſee, how unhappy and miſerable they are who continue in it, what miſcarriages they fall into in *Life*, how far they are out of the way to *Felicity*, and how they are led away Captives by their enemies; ſome, by *Incontinence*; others, by *Avarice*;

Avarice; others, by *Vanity*; and by all the other Vices, wherein they are ſo entangled, that it is impoſſible for them to get out of them. So that, for the remainder of their days, they are in perpetual diſtractions, not able to find out the way, which conducts them to *True Doctrine*; becauſe they have forgot the precepts and directions, which the *Genius* had given them, at their firſt entrance into *Life*. What you ſay ſeems to me to be very true, but I have yet one difficulty to propoſe. Why do the *Vertues* ſhew him the place whence he came? It is, reply'd he, becauſe he had no certain and real knowledg of what paſſes there; and that, by reaſon of the *Errour* and *Ignorance*, which he had been preſented with, by *Impoſture*; he was miſtaken in the diſcerning of *Good* and *Evil*. Whence it came to paſs, that he led an unhappy Life, and like that of thoſe who had continu'd in it. But having acquired the true *Science* of things, he hath this happineſs, and this advantage, that he may, at his

his own eaſe, conſider the miſeries of others, without the leaſt apprehenſion of being expos'd thereto himſelf.

When he hath excercis'd his contemplation upon all that, what becomes of him? He goes up and down, which way he pleaſes. There is no place, where he is not in ſafety, as much as if he were in the * *Corycian Cave*. For whither ſoever he goes, he is aſſur'd, that he ſhall always live irreproachably, that all people will entertain him, and that with ſuch pleaſure and ſatisfaction, as a ſick perſon does his Phyſician. How, ſaid I, is he no longer afraid of thoſe Women whom you call Monſters, ſince he is excepted from all thoſe Evils, which men are ſubject to through their means?

* *The entrance of it was ſo difficult that it ſeem'd habitable only by the Gods. See* Pomp. Mela de ſit. Orb.

He abſolutely defies them, reply'd he. He ſhall be no longer tormented, either by *Grief*, or *Vexation*, or *Incontinence*, or *Avarice*, or *Indigence*, or any other Monſter; becauſe

becauſe he hath an abſolute power over them, nay hath a certain Soverainty over the Evils, whereby he was perſecuted before. And as thoſe who have been once ſtung by a Viper, ordinarily carry about them a Preſervative, to ſecure themſelves againſt the Venome of all other Serpents; ſo is it not in the power of any thing to hurt him any more; becauſe he always hath the remedy about him.

What you ſay is admirable, but, I pray, inform me, who they are, whom I perceive coming down from the Hill; ſome are Crown'd, and betray their joy in their very countenances; others, on the contrary, have their heads and hips all bruis'd, and are detain'd Priſoners by thoſe Women? They who are Crown'd, reply'd he, are ſuch as have been preſerv'd by *True Doctrine*, therefore do they diſcover their alacrity and joy. As for the others, who have no Crowns; ſome of them having been rejected by *True Doctrine* return from her,

Miſerable

Miſerable and Unhappy; and the others having ſpent all their courage, after they had got up as far as *Patience*, take their way back again, and inconſiderately wander up and down through deſolate places. The Women, who follow them, are *Affliction*, *Deſpair*, *Ignominy*, and *Ignorance*. If it be as you ſay, there are no Evils whereby they are not perſecuted.

That is alſo true, reply'd he; but there is yet more in it: when they are come back within the firſt Encloſure, towards *Voluptuouſneſs* and *Incontinence*, they do not accuſe themſelves of having done amiſs, nay, on the contrary, they raile at *True Doctrine*, they look on all that follow her, as unfortunate and miſerable perſons, who are got out of the way which ought to be follow'd, and who have loſt the Goods, whereof they imagin'd themſelves poſſeſs'd. What may thoſe Goods be? ſaid I. To tell you in a word, reply'd he, it is *Debauchedneſs* and *Incontinence*. For they

they place the chief Good, in eating and drinking, as Beasts, do.

I pray, tell me, how you call those Women, who are so chearful and so jocund in their return? They are *Opinions*, who, having conducted, to *True Doctrine*, those who are now among the *Vertues*, are returning back to bring others thither, and to give others an assurance, that such as they have conducted thither are perfectly happy.

Do they go quite to the *Vertues*, said I? No, for *Opinion* is not permitted to come up to *Science* they do not conduct any further than to *True Doctrine*, and as soon as they have recommended any one into her hands, they immediately return, to find out others. Wherein they may be compar'd to those Vessels, which are fill'd with other Merchandizes, as soon as they are unloaden of what they had before. It must be confess'd, that you

you make what you ſay very comprehenſible, ſaid he; but you have not yet explicated to me what directions the *Genius* gives thoſe who enter into *Life*. Only this, ſaid he, that they be courageous. Do you therefore, my Friends, take courage. For I will give you ſatisfaction even to the leaſt particulars, ſo that nothing ſhall eſcape your knowledg. Certainly, ſaid I, we are extreamly oblig'd to you.

Whereupon directing his hand again towards the Picture. Do you ſee, ſaid he, that Woman who is blind, and who ſtands upon the Ball, whom erewhile we called *Fortune*? We ſee her very well. The *Genius*, reply'd he, gives them this advertiſement, that no credit is to be given to what ſhe ſaies, and abſolutely charges them, not to conſider what proceeds from her, as any thing certain and ſtable; ſince that, in fine, nothing hinders her depriving us of what ſhe gives us, to diſpoſe it into other hands, ſince it

it is one of her ordinary pranks. For that reaſon is it alſo, that he adviſes them, not to be overcome by her Preſents, not to betray any extraordinary joy, when they happen to us, and, in like manner, not to be dejected, when they are taken away from us; not to afford them our praiſe, or diſpraiſe, and to have this conceit of her, that ſhe does not any thing by the dictate of reaſon; but always inconſiderately, and by chance. Thence he alſo adviſes us not to admire any thing ſhe does, and not to imitate thoſe deceitful Bankiers, who having received other mens Mony, are as glad, as if it were their own, and are angry when it is called for in from them, as if ſome great injury were done them: not remembring that it was put into their hands, only for the Creditors convenience to take it in, when he pleas'd. Thus doth the *Genius* direct us to look on the Favours of *Fortune*, and to be always mindful, that it is her cuſtom, to take away again whatever ſhe gives, to reſtore ſometimes

times more than ſhe had ever beſtow'd, and to carry away; after all that, not only what ſhe had lately given, but all a man was poſſeſs'd of before. Hence is it, that he adviſes them, to accept of the Goods ſhe gives, and immediately to make their recourſe to *True Doctrine*, who will abſolutely ſecure the poſſeſſion thereof, if they can be but preſerv'd, till they have come up quite to her. For this *Doctrine* is nothing elſe but the true *Science* of ſuch things as are beneficial, and the aſſured and clear poſſeſſion thereof. Hence is it, that he minds them of making their applications as ſoon as they can to her. And if it happen, that they meet with *Incontinence* or *Voluptuouſneſs*, he Councils them to get out of their company with the ſooneſt, and not to credit what they ſay, till they come to *Falſe Doctrine*. For he enjoyns them to continue there a while, and to take of her what ſhe pleaſes, as it were by the way, and without making any halt, that they may haſten thence towards *True Doctrine*.

Doctrine. And these are the Instructions which the *Genius* gives; if any one slights them, or comprehends them not as he ought to do, he becomes a wicked person, and perishes miserably.

This is the Riddle, my Friends, which you see represented in that Embleme. If now you are desirous to put any question to me, for the better understanding of every thing in particular, I am as willing to give you all the satisfaction I can, and not to conceal any thing from you.

You say very well, reply'd I; but if you are so pleas'd, tell us, what the *Genius* enjoynes them to receive from *False Doctrine*? Those things, reply'd he, which seem necessary to Life, as *Learning*, and other things relating to *Study*, which *Plato* affirmed had certain curbs to prevent young people from being inclin'd otherwise. Not that they are absolutely necessary in order to an arrival to *True*

Doctrine; for we are not meliorated thereby. Without them, we may come to the perfection of *Vertue*, but they facilitate our acqueſt of it, and are not without ſome advantage. We may, indeed, acquire the knowledg of what is unknown to us, by the means of an Interpreter, explicating to us what we underſtand not: yet is it better to be acquainted with the Language, and not to ſtand in need of an Interpreter. So, without theſe *Sciences*, nothing obſtructs our attaining of *Vertue*. 'Tis true, they are Ornaments, and excellent Directories, whereby we are illuminated in the purſuit of it; but it follows not, that they, who are endued therewith, are in a better condition, or have a greater bent to goodneſs, ſince they are deceiv'd, as well as others, in the knowledg of *Good* and *Evil*, and, many times, defiled with all manner of Vices and Miſdemeanours. No, no, continu'd he, nothing hinders, but that he; who is come to Learning

ing by Study, and hath attain'd all the Sciences, may be as much inclin'd to Debauchery, Avarice, Incontinence, Injuſtice, Unfaithfulneſs, and Extravagance, as another. This we are convinc'd of, by daily experience. Why then ſhould they aſſume any advantage to themſelves above others, in order to their melioration, upon the account of thoſe Sciences? I think we have already ſufficiently ſhewn, by what we have ſaid, that there is no likelyhood of any ſuch thing. It may be, thoſe perſons imagine they are in a better condition than others, becauſe they are within the ſecond Encloſure, and conſequently at a leſs diſtance from *True Doctrine*. But what advantage is it to them, that they are not at ſo great a diſtance from her, as the others, ſince we ſometimes find thoſe perſons, who were with *Incontinence*, come up, from the firſt Encloſure, to the third, and aſcend even to *True Doctrine*, leaving thoſe Learned

men behind them. How then can it be imagin'd, that they ſhould have any Prerogative, ſince that, many times, with all their Sciences, they are longer than the others, ere they take into the right Way, and diſcover more difficulty in Learning what they ought to know, in order to their arrival thereto. For they, who are in the ſecond Encloſure, though there were nothing elſe to be objected againſt them, profeſs a knowledg of what they know not: and while they continue in that ſentiment, it is impoſſible they ſhould ever come to *True Doctrine*. I believe, you alſo perceive, that the *Opinions* come from the firſt Encloſure towards them. Thence comes it, that they are no better than the others, if *Repentance* do not accompany them, and if they admit not a perſuaſion of their not having *True Science*, but that they are ſtill ſeduced by *Falſe Doctrine*. For while they remain in that condition, it is impoſſible they ſhould ever become happy.

Therefore

Therefore, my Friends, you are ſeriouſly to endeavour the practiſe of theſe Inſtructions, and to reflect on them, till you have converted them into a habit. Let them be the ſubject of your moſt earneſt meditation, aſſuring your ſelves, that your thoughts cannot be too much fixt upon them. All the reſt is, in compariſon, nothing conſiderable, nay it is rather to be look'd on as of no advantage, and ſuperfluous. Be mindful then to do what I tell you; for otherwiſe, all you have already underſtood will not be any way beneficial to you.

We ſhall not be negligent in the doing of it, ſaid I to him: yet give us this further explication, why you put not into the number of *Goods*, thoſe things which men receive from *Fortune*, as *Life*, *Health*, *Wealth*, *Reputation*, *Children*, *Victory*, and all other concerns of that kind? Tell us alſo, why you put not into the number of

Evils, thoſe things which are contrary thereto? To be free with you, all you have told us, as to that particular, ſeems to us a Paradox. I beſeech you, take the pains to tell us what you think of it. With all my heart, reply'd the Old Man. Do you think, ſaid he, that *Life* is a *Good*, in him, that does not live *Well*? No, reply'd I; on the contrary, I hold it to be an *Evil* for him. But as *Life* ſeems to me to be an *Evil*, in thoſe who live *Ill*; ſo do I imagine it to be a *Good*, in thoſe who live *Well*.

That cannot be, reply'd he, for it is impoſſible, that the ſame thing ſhould be both *good* and *bad*, inaſmuch as it would be, by that means, *beneficial* and *hurtful*, the object of *deſire* and *averſion*, at the ſame time; which is a contradiction. But let us ſay more, let us acknowledg, that there is a great difference between *living*, and *living ill*. The wicked *Life* is always an *Evil*, and Life, indefinitely ſpeaking, cannot be

be ſuch. Is not that your meaning? It is ſo, reply'd I. The conſequence then will be, reply'd he, that *Life* is never an *Evil*, ſince that, if it were ſuch, it would follow, that there muſt be ſomewhat of *Evil* in thoſe who live *Well*, ſince they would have Life, which were an Evil; a poſition not maintainable. As therefore *Life* is common to both *Good* and *Bad*, it muſt be neceſſarily inferr'd, that, of it ſelf, it is neither *good* nor *bad*. It may be compar'd to Cauſticks and Inciſions, which may be beneficial to the indiſpos'd, and hurtful to thoſe who are in health. But that you may the better comprehend this truth, conſider in your ſelf, whether you would not prefer a noble and a generous *Death*, before a wicked, and an infamous *Life*? I am confident you would not make any pauſe at it, and that you would embrace Death. No queſtion of it, reply'd I. Then by conſequence, ſaid he, Death is no Evil, ſince it is ſometimes more advantageous to dye than to live. The ſame thing is

to be ſaid concerning ſickneſs and health. There are certain times, and certain occurrences, wherein health would be prejudicial to us. And to make it appear that it is ſo, let us make the ſame conſideration of Wealth. Do we not daily ſee, that ſome very rich men live a lewd and miſerable Life? No, no, continu'd he, Wealth contributes nothing to happy Life; but, on the contrary, the wealthieſt, for the moſt part, are the moſt unhappy. Let us then conclude, that it is not *Wealth*, but *True Doctrine* that begets an inclination to goodneſs. And thence it juſtly follows, that Riches are not to be numbred among Goods, inaſmuch as they do not make men better, or more happy. So that, as they are hurtful to thoſe who cannot tell how to uſe them, ſo can they not be accounted Goods, ſince it is ſometimes advantageous to be without them. If therefore there be any one that knows how to make good uſe of them, he ſhall live happy; if not, he ſhall be miſerable.

In

In fine, to ſum up all in a word, that which creates diſorder and confuſion in the minds of men, is, the *Opinion* they have, of theſe kinds of things. Some ſhun them, as the ſource of all Evils, and others ſeek after them, as true Goods, imagining that by their means only they may become happy. Nay they are ſo fixt in this perſuaſion, that to attain theſe, they make no difficulty of committing the greateſt enormities, and moſt deteſtable actions. Which happens to them, becauſe they know not the nature of true *Good*. * They know not, that, from *Evil*, there never proceeds any good. They conſider not that moſt men have acquired their wealth and poſſeſſions, by the means of their Crimes, as by Perfidiouſneſs, Robberies, Murthers, Rapine, and other enormous actions. If therefore it be true, that no Good proceeds from Evil, and yet that Riches are many times the production of Crimes, it inevitably follows, that Riches cannot be called Goods. Again, Good and Evil are incompatible;

*This I take out of the Latine Verſion of Odaxius.

tible; and as it is impoſſible to acquire Wiſdome and Juſtice by bad actions, ſo will it not ever be granted, that Extravagance and Injuſtice can proceed from any good cauſe. Since therefore it is true, that nothing hinders but that Riches, Glory, Victory, and other things of that kind, may happen to us by lawful ways, let us make this concluſion, that, of themſelves, they are neither good nor evil, and that, properly ſpeaking, not any thing but Wiſdome, is a Good, and nothing but Folly that is Evil.

A

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FINIS.

8° A. 112. Art.

THE LIFE, AND PHILOSOPHY, OF *EPICTETUS.*

With THE

EMBLEME OF Humane Life, By *CEBES.*

Rendred into Engliſh, by
JOHN DAVIES *of* Kidwelly.

LONDON,
Printed by *T. R.* for *John Martyn*, and are to be Sold at the Sign of the *Bell* without *Temple Bar*, 1670.

BIBLIOTHECA BODLEIANA

TO THE
Right HONOURABLE,
PHILIP HOWARD
OF
NORFOLK,
Lord Almoner *to her moſt Sacred Majeſty of* Great Brittain, *&c.*

TO prove the productions of the *Ancients* extraordinary and tranſcendent in their kinds, it would be hard for me to bring a greater Teſtimony, then the preſent I heer make your Lordſhip of theſe two ſmall, yet Maſter-Pieces of *Morality*. The vene-

ration and esteem wherewith they have been entertain'd through so many Ages sufficiently argue, that Time, with all its envy, hath not been able to make any diminution of their Original excellency.

For, who can reflect on *Epictetus*, without a certain astonishment at his exemplary *Constancy*? Who can think on the strictness of his *Precepts*, without framing to himself an Idæa of that noble *Insensibility*, which the *Stoicks* requir'd in their *Virtuoso*? Who can view him so *indifferent* and *unconcern'd* in the greatest emergencies,

cies, and not be convinc'd, that there may be an undiſtracted purſuit of Vertue through all the diſgraces and inconveniences of humane Life? Who, in fine, ſhall conſider him laying down *Humility* for the Ground-work of his *Morals*, and not be ſurpriz'd at the ſtrange illumination of a *Heathen* Philoſopher?

Theſe, my Lord, were the Characters which endear'd *Epictetus* to all the lovers of vertuous action, and rais'd him out of the miſeries of Servitude into a familiarity with Emperours. From which con-

ſiderations I muſt acknowledge my ſelf encourag'd to recommend him, in his preſent dreſs, to your Patronage, preſuming that, with theſe Qualifications, he muſt be kindly receiv'd by a Perſon, who hath prefer'd the ſplendor ariſing from Chriſtian Auſterities and Mortifications before all the advantages of Nature or Fortune; and with him the ſincerity and ſubmiſſion wherewith I am,

My Lord,

Your moſt humbly

devoted Servant

J. DAVIES.

THE PREFACE.

TO make some estimate of the value which hath been from time to time set on the Dictates of Epictetus, *we may content our selves with this remark, that so many Learned Hands have been employ'd either in the rendring of them into other Languages, or the explication of them in his own. In the* Latine, *there are many Versions; of all which it is not our design here to give any parti-*

particular account. In English, *I cannot find that it hath appear'd above once before, done as close as could be to the Original, and as well as the* English *could bear it: which Edition came out about the year* 1610. *entituled,* The Manual of Epictetus.

In the French *Tongue, several eminent Persons spent their pains about it, among whom Monsieur* Boileau *is the last, and consequently the most exact, in regard he had consulted all that had gone before him on this subject. His labours herein prov'd so acceptable, that in few years his Work came to a third Impression, which*

which appearing abroad in the year 1667. *is the Original of this Tranſlation. It ſeems, in the precedent Editions Monſ.* Boileau *had intituled it* The Enchiridion of Epictetus; *but in the laſt, out of complyance with the advice of ſome Friends, and a reflection that ſome Words, as they are not ſo eaſily pronounc'd, ſo are they not ſo eaſily naturaliz'd as others, he put out that Title, and call'd it, the* Philoſophy of Epictetus.

Monſieur Du Vair, *who ſome years ſince tranſlated this Tract, was pleas'd to call it alſo the* Manual of Epictetus. *But our Author*

thor declin'd that name too, partly out of a conſideration that the Word Manual ſeems to be particularly conſecrateed to Works of Devotion and Piety, and partly, that Enchiridion is a Greek Term, which, in this place, properly ſignifies a Ponyard. The reaſon alledged by Simplicius, why Arrian gave it that Title, is this; That, as Ponyards are light Armes, which we commonly carry about us, to be us'd when we are ſurpriz'd by our Enemies: So ſhould we always have this little Book before our eyes, that we may the better oppoſe the aſſaults of our Paſſions, a kind of domeſtick

Enemies,

Enemies, whereof we ſhould be alwaies diſtruſtfull. Had our Author been ſatisfy'd with this fancy of Simplicius, *he would ſtill have entituled his Book, the* Ponyard of Epictetus; *but ſomewhat improperly, inaſmuch as beſides that it might have frighted ſome Readers, it ſounded not well to attribute either defenſive or offenſive Armes to* Epictetus, *a Philoſopher ſo ſignall for his Conſtancy and Patience. Upon which reflections he thought beſt to call it ſimply the* Philoſophy of Epictetus.

Monſ. Boileau *affirms further of himſelf, that, for the better under-*

der-

derſtanding of the Original Author, he got all the helps he could out of the Diſcourſes of Arrian *and the* Greek *Commentary of* Simplicius, *an excellent Work, comprehending the whole* Morality *of the* Stoicks. *He ſaies alſo, that, among the many* Latine *Verſions, he kept moſt cloſely to thoſe of* Politian *and* Wolfius, *as the moſt exactly done; not forgetting the late labour of* Salmaſius *upon this Piece, in a large Commentary upon that of* Simplicius.

But what our Authour moſt eſteems in this Work of his, is the Life of Epictetus, *which had not*

not been written in any Language before, and consequently must require the greater pains, since it was to be collected out of so many several Authors. Had he pleas'd, he might have made it larger; but some things have been omitted, that it might be the more proportion'd to this Abridgment.

At the end of the Philosophy follows Cebes's Tablet, that is, an Embleme, or Representation of Humane Life, before which there is a Preface giving an account of it. These two Pieces have been for the most joyned together,

gether, partly upon a consideration of the allyance of the Subject, and partly upon that of their Antiquity.

J. D.

THE LIFE OF EPICTETUS.

EPICTETUS was born neer the end of *Nero's* Empire, at *Hierapolis*, a City of *Phrygia*. Of his birth there is no certaine account, for his Father and Mother are equally unknown. All the certainty we have of him is, that he was a [b] Slave of one, named *Epaphroditus*, a Libertine, and one of the Captains of *Nero's*

Su'd. in Epict.

[b] Arrian. Diss. l. 1. c. 9.

[b] Arr. Diſſ. l. 1. c. 9. *Nero's* Life-Guard, a perſon recommendable upon no other ſcore, ſave that of being Maſter to ſo illuſtrious a Slave.

Arrian relates of this *Epaphroditus* two actions, among others, worthy certainly the Genius of the perſon, and which I the rather take notice of here, becauſe, I conceive, they perfectly expreſſe his character. One day, this Man, ſold to another Officer of *Nero's*, one of his Slaves, named *Felicion*, by profeſſion a Shoo-maker, as accounting him no expert Workman. That Slave coming afterwards, by that means, to be the Emperour's Shoo-maker, and *Epaphroditus* hearing of it, treated him with extraordinary civilities and reſpects, and at length made him his greateſt Friend and Confident.

[c] Arrian. Diſſ. l. 1. c. 26. [c] Another time, a certain Man caſting himſelf at his feet, extreamly deploring the croſſneſſe of his Fortune, and complaining, that, of all his eſtate, he had but a hundred and fifty thouſand crowns left, *Epaphroditus* made anſwer, In troth, Friend, I much wonder, that you have had the patience to forbear ſpeaking of it ſo long. Which he ſayd, not by way of ralliery, but very ſeriouſly, and out of a real admiration. It

It was under the verge of this imperious Maſter that [d] *Epictetus* paſs'd away the firſt years of his life. About what time, or how he obtained his Liberty, is not known; onely this we find, that under the reign of *Domitian*, there being a publick Edict, for the departure of all the Philoſophers out of *Rome* and *Italy*, *Epictetus* was oblig'd, among others, to retire to *Nicopolis*, a City of *Epirus*, now called *Preveza*. This is a clear argument, that he had then obtain'd liberty, ſince he was forc'd, as a *Philoſopher*, to leave *Rome*. Nor indeed is it to be imagin'd, that a perſon of his merit, belov'd and eſteem'd by the Emperours of his time, ſhould continue in Slavery.

[d] Aul. Gel. *Noct. Att. l.* 12. *c.* 11. Suet. *in Domit. Philoſt. l.* 7. Dion. Chryſoſt. *de Exil.* Euſeb. *in Chron.*

It is generally beleeved, that after his exile, he never return'd to *Rome*, and that his conſtant aboad was at *Nicopolis*; for *Arrian* affirms in ſeverall places, that the *Diſcourſes* he collected of his, were held by him at *Nicopolis*. But I queſtion the truth of this conjecture, notwithſtanding the Authority of [f] *Salmaſius*. For [g] *Spartian* writes, among other things, that the Emperour *Hadrian* entertain'd this Philoſopher with much familiarity. Now how that could be, I

[†] *l.* 2. *c.* 6.

[f] *In Not. ad Epict. & Sim. p.* 4.

[g] *In Vit. Hadr. p.* 8.

cannot imagine, if *Epictetus* continued ſtill at *Nicopolis*. But whether *Epictetus* liv'd in that City or not, is of no great concern to his Life.

Nor do I know whether he were ever married; but as I affirm it not, ſo do I neither deny it. For [b] *Arrian* obſerves that *Epictetus* blam'd the *Epicureans* for their ſpeaking againſt Marriage. But that he was not married, ſeems deducible hence, that though he did not account Marriage incompatible with vertue, yet he thought it a great obſtacle to the attainment of perfection. But whether he were married or not, it is very likely he had no Children, or at leaſt no Daughters. For beſides that his having any is not mentioned in any Author; [k] *Lucian* relates, that one day *Epictetus* perſwading *Demonax* to take a Wife, *Demonax* jeeringly made anſwer, 'Well, I am content to do it, conditionally you give me one of your Daughters.

[b] *l.* 3. *c.* 7.

Arr. *Diſſ. l.* 3. *c.* 22.

[k] *In* Dem.

Moreover, [l] *Spartian* affirms, that *Hadrian* exercis'd great liberalities and reſpects towards the Poets, Orators, Philoſophers, Mathematicians, and all Profeſſors of Science. But whatever

[l] *In* Vit. Hadr.

Spartian

Spartian relates of that Prince, of whom it may be ſayd, that never any man took ſuch pleaſure in abuſing and ſcoffing at thoſe very perſons, as he did; certain it is, that *Epictetus* was always very poor, and that neither the ſayd Emperour, nor his Succeſſors, who ſo highly eſteemed him, did advance him much, if at all, in matter of wealth; and poſſibly this might proceed from his great contempt thereof. For it is granted, he lived at *Rome* in a little houſe, which had not ſo much as a door. [m] All the Attendants he had was an old Servant maid, and all his Houſhould-ſtuff, an earthen Lamp, by the light whereof he brought forth thoſe noble and divine reflections; of which we have at this day the remainders in the Books of *Arrian*. Whence it may be gueſſed how poor he was.

[m] Vincent. Obſop. *l.* 3. *Anth. ad Epig.* Epictet.

But to return to his Sentiments and Morality; Modeſty was his darling and moſt familiar Vertue. Hence came it, that he affirmed, 'There was no neceſſity 'of adorning houſes with Tapeſtry and 'Pictures, but that they were to be fur-'niſhed with Modeſty and Temperance; 'for thoſe were the ornaments that laſt 'alwaies, and never grow old, or are

Strob. *Ser.* 38.

"out of fashion. He had so far renounc'd ambition and ostentation, that if ever *Philosopher* did things out of humility, it may be said that he was the person. For as there was not any man, in his time, that did so many good Actions as he; so was there not any that ever made it so much his business to conceal them, and to have it believ'd that he had not done them. Whence it came, that amongst the Instructions he gave his *Disciples*, these were the chiefest:

Enchir. Epict. *If you are so happy as to have learnt to satisfie your body with little, make no ostentation of it. If you have brought your self to a custom of drinking only water, forbear bragging of it. If you have a desire to enter upon some painful exercise, do it privately. Whatever may come of it, do nothing out of a design to be observ'd, or admir'd by the people. All these affectations are vain, and unbecoming a Philosopher.*

And indeed *Epictetus* was at so great a distance from vanity, that though he were the ablest of any of his time, to Write, yet was he never inclin'd to do it; though that be an humour which hath been predominant over the noblest Souls. For if his Disciple *Arrian* had not

not reduc'd to writing, what he had heard him deliver by word of mouth, *Epictetus* would haply have been a name unknown in the world. Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. l. 17. c. 9.

He was of opinion also, that a true Philosopher ought to *do*, and not to *speak*. He accordingly affirm'd, that most of those, who took upon them to be Philosophers, were only such as to the denomination; but not such in effect. One day, a certain person being displeas'd at some others pittying of him; *Friend*, said *Epictetus* to him, *you are much to blame for being so angry. For upon this very account that you are offended at your being bemoan'd, you are deservedly pittied.* Another time, observing a Man who was engag'd in a most infamous Debauch, and careless of all honour and reputation, falling into discourse of Study and Philosophy, he cryed out; *O extravagant man! what dost thou mean to do? Hast thou consider'd whether thy Vessel be pure and clean, before thou pourest any thing into it? For otherwise, whatever thou hast put into it, will be corrupted and turned into Urine or Vineger, or something worse.*

Φιλοσόφους ἄνευ τοῦ πράττειν μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν.

Arr. Diss. l. 4. c. 6.

A. Gell. Noct. Att. l. 17. c. 19.

A. Gellius, who relates this passage, conceives there could not be any thing

more judiciously, or more truly spoken; as if he would insinuate, that when Philosophy, and the other Sciences fall into a sordid soul, defil'd with Vice; they are, as it were, in a foul and unclean Vessel, where they are tainted, and beget nothing but corruption.

Arr. *l.* 4. *Dissert. c.* 12.

But *Epictetus* had a quality, which I esteem the more, in that it is a rare one, even in a Philosopher. He was an extraordinary lover of Neatness; and would say sometimes, that he would rather see one of his Disciples with his hair well comb'd, and in good order, than tangled and nasty. But though he were so great a lover of Neatness, yet was it not ever the more observable in his own person. He was infirm of Body, and lame, by reason of a defluxion fallen down into his leg. He does ingeniously acknowledge as much in an *Epigram* he made of himself, which might be thus rendred;

A Gell. *Noct. Att. l.* 2. *c.* 18.

Δοῦλος Ἐπίκτητος γενόμην καὶ σῶμ' ἀράπορος,
Καὶ πενίην Ἶρος καὶ φίλος ἀθανάτοις.

Born,

Born, indispos'd of Body, and a Slave;
Kindness, from Fortune, I could never find;
But this advantage from the Gods I have,
Their unexhausted Treasures fill my Mind.

Planudes, in his Collection of Greek Epigrams, falsly attributes this to *Leonidas*, as *Vincentius Obsopæus* hath well observ'd: and after him, *Salmasius*, who also pretends that this Epigram is not *Epictetus*'s, and that it was added to *A. Gellius* by some *not-deeply-learnt* person. All the reason he gives of it, is, That it is not found in an ancient Manuscript of *Aulus Gellius*'s: I am apt to believe it might be so. But if this conjecture be true; it must be also granted, that the same *not-deeply-learned* person had got it added to *Macrobius*, who cites it, as *Epictetus*'s, in the first Book of his *Saturnalia*, and brings in the same words of *Aulus Gellius*. But indeed the reason, arguing this Epigram not to be *Epictetus*'s, is this, that it cannot easily be presum'd, a Philosopher, so remarkable for his modesty and humility, as he was, should speak so advantageously of his own worth.

In Antholog. *Lib.* 7. *cap.* 47.

c. 11.

Howere it might be, this is most certain,

tain, that Fortune had not the leaſt kindneſs for *Epictetus*; yet did not her Perſecutions ever oblige him to make his addreſſes ever the more to Great Perſons. *They are very much to blame,* ſaid he ſometimes, *to pride themſelves in the conceit that ſo many court them with their reſpects and ſervices. Do they imagine, that it is for their own ſakes all theſe ſubmiſſions are made? Every one, as to that particular minds his own concern, which taken away they are ſoon ſlighted. They are juſtly ſerv'd, as Aſſes are: If they be rubb'd or curry'd, it is in order to ſome ſervice to be got out of them. So we reverence thoſe men, as men do the Feaver at* Rome. *If Altars be erected to her, it is out of a fear of the hurt ſhe may do. But what ſo great miſchief,* continu'd he, *are we afraid of at their hands? The worſt they can do is to ſend us into another World. What matters it? Muſt we not alwaies expect death? Are not all the waies to Death equal? And is not that, through which a Tyrant ſends us, many times the ſhorteſt and the eaſieſt? In a word, no Tyrant was ever ſo cruel as to be above ſix months in torturing a man to death, Whereas a Feaver is ſometimes above a year ere it diſpatches him.*

Arr. Diſſ. l. 1. c. 19.

Arr. Diſſ. l. 2. c. 6.

When he met with any of thoſe Perſons

ſons, who are of opinion they tranſcend others, becauſe they are in favour with the Prince, or can derive their Pedigree from a long ſeries of Anceſtors; he treated them after a very pleaſant manner. *You imagine*, ſaid he to them, *becauſe your Grand-father was* Conſul, *your Father a* Senator, *and you are* Cæſar's Favourite, *that you are more at liberty, and of better quality than another. Know that you are more a Slave, than the meaneſt Slave among the popular, and that the condition of ſuch a one is better than yours. For if he be ill-treated ſometimes by an imperious Maſter, you are continually domineer'd over and tormented by Ambition, or ſome other Paſſion. The only advantage you have over him is, that he is but a Slave in ſome courſe-cloath, and you are one in a Scarlet-coat. Beſides, if he does not his duty, he muſt expect the laſh or ſome ſuch puniſhment; whereas, if you do not yours, you are ſomewhat more honourably dealt withal; for your head is ſtruck off, as beſeems a Favourite of* Cæſar's. Arr. Diſſ. l. 4. c. 1.

Thus were Perſons of quality treated by *Epictetus*: So that his extream poverty, and the meanneſs of his extraction, could not check him out of the humour of making ſport at their Wealth, and

and imaginary Grandeurs: His vertue had exalted him above all thoſe things, And though Fortune alwaies wreak'd her malice upon him, yet would he never repine, but paſſ'd away his life in perpetual content.

But if he might juſtly complain of the niggardlyneſs of Fortune towards him, as to corporeal accommodations; he was on the other ſide to acknowledge the profuſeneſs of Heaven towards him, as to the advantages of his Mind. It ſeem'd the former had not declar'd her ſelf his enemy; but that his triumph over her might be the more glorious. Nay, I dare affirm, that Bondage, and the infirmity of his Body were the neceſſary retinue of his Vertue, that it might appear with greater luſtre to poſterity. For, without flattery, never did any perſon force up conſtancy to ſo noble a height.

Origen. *l.* 7. *cont.* Celſ.

While he was yet a Slave to *Epaphroditus*, that humerous Brute would needs one time, make it his ſport to wrinch his Leg. *Epitletus*, perceiving that he took a certain pleaſure in ſo doing, and that he renew'd the exerciſe with greater ſtrength, ſaid to him ſmiling, and without

without seeming any way mov'd thereat; *If you continue this sport, you will certainly break my Leg:* Accordingly, that having happen'd, as he had foretold it; all he said to him was, *Well, did I not tell you that you would break my Leg?* Was there ever Constancy equal to this? Was it not, as I may say, an out-braving of Fortune's extravagance, and the infirmity of our Nature. *Celsus* transported with an Enthusiasme of Philosophy, makes this patience of his transcend whatever might pretend to that name, so far as to be guilty of an abhominable impiety, by heightning the patience of *Epictetus* above that of our Saviour *Jesus Christ*. If the malice of Time had not depriv'd us of the Book which *Arrian* writ of his *Life* and *Death*, I am confident, we should have found many other as great examples of his Patience. Nor is it to be doubted, but that a man, who so suffer'd his Leg to be broken, had before made discoveries of his Constancy upon several other occations. And indeed this Vertue was so attendant on him, that it forsook him not even in the most considerable actions of his Life. Thence it came that he said,

Celsus affirm'd the patience of Epictetus, to be greater then that of Jesus Christ.

Simpl. in Ench. Epict. init.

If

If your Oyle be ſpilt, or your Wine ſtollen out of your Cellar; you are to make this reflection in your ſelf, That by ſuch caſualties is Conſtancy purchas'd. But if he maintain'd theſe Maximes with much earneſtneſs, he obſerv'd them with no leſs rigour.

Arr. *Diſſ. l.2. c.6.* For one day this Philoſopher having bought an Iron-lamp, which he thought a very precious piece of Houſhold-ſtuff; as he was in a deep meditation in the Chimney-corner, a Thief came into his Room, and ſtole away his Lamp, without his perceiving of him. So that a while after, *Epictetus* looking about, and miſſing his Lamp, fell a ſmiling, and without any diſturbance, ſaid, *I ſhall deceive this Thief to morrow, for if he comes for another Lamp, it ſhall be but an Earthen one.*

True it is, we cannot affirm this action was of equal gallantry with the former; yet, in my judgment, it is no leſs remarkable. There is not ought, wherein the Genius of perſons is ſo diſcoverable, as in their trivial things; inaſmuch as the Soul appears therein, as it were, ſtript of the diſguiſe of all ſorts of Paſſions: Whereas in great matters ſhe is in a manner alwaies diſ-

guis'd,

guis'd; Intereſt, or Ambition cauſing her, moſt commonly, to act contrary to the natural bent of her inclination.

But to return to our Philoſopher; it may be truly ſaid, That never man knew better how to ſuffer, than he did. It was a Science he had learnt even from his tendreſt age, and wherein he improv'd himſelf to the laſt moment of his life. He needed not Companions in his misfortunes, that he might derive Conſolation from their joynt-ſuffering. He never ſought any but in himſelf; and if his mind were ſenſible of any grief, it was only of the grief of others. He thought it the greateſt mark of the malignancy of a corrupt nature, to imagine evil leſs burthenſom, when ſeveral other perſons participate of it with us: as if our ſufferings were heightned, or remitted, proportionably to the augmentation or diminution of theirs.

According to this Principle was it, that he affirmed thoſe perſons were ridiculous, who complain'd, that none were unjuſtly dealt with but themſelves. *How*, ſaid he, *if you are ſentenc'd to have your head ſtruck off, would you have all other Men*

Men condemn'd to the ſame puniſhment; and can you find no Conſolation, but in the deſtruction of Mankind? Thence it came that *Epictetus* ſo highly celebrated the conſtancy, and great courage of *Lateranus*. For *Nero* having condemn'd him to have his head ſtruck off, and the Executioner having but ſlightly wounded him at the firſt blow, he had the heart to lift up his head, and to ſtretch forth his neck the ſecond time. Nay, a little before his death, *Epaphroditus* making ſome Interrogatives to him about the Conſpiracy he was charg'd withal, he undauntedly made this Anſwer; *If I had any thing elſe to ſay, I would tell it thy Maſter, and not Thee.*

Arr Diſ. l. 1. c. 2.

As *Epictetus* was the moſt reſolute, and the moſt conſtant of all Men, ſo were the judgments he made of Reſolution, and Conſtancy, better and more ſound, than thoſe of any other. For though he were moſt intimately acquainted with theſe two Vertues, as being his firſt and moſt ancient inclinations, yet could he not endure them, if they had the leaſt blemiſh, that rendred them inſupportable. As he would not have a Man to be heartleſs and cowardly,

ly, ſo would he neither have him to be temerarious. When a man might go through a plain, or ſome eaſy paſſage, he would not have adviſ'd him, to take his way through ſteepy and rough places. He was not of the humour of that Philoſopher, who would rather have a Cart paſs over his body, then turn out of his way to avoid it. *Epictetus* behav'd himſelf otherwiſe; for when *Epaphroditus* made it his ſport to break his legg, he generouſly endur'd it; but if *Epaphroditus* had had the good nature, to have forborn that diverſion, he had very much oblig'd him. He thought it as great a vanity and ſhame, for a man to run himſelf into danger, where there was no neceſſity for the doing of it, as there was honour and Virtue, to embrace it, when his duty oblig'd him thereto. Diog. Laert. in vitâ Pyrrh.

But when Reaſon requir'd a man's expoſing of himſelf to danger, he would then have him think of no delay, but look on all inconveniencies and difficulties as ſo many trials of our Virtue, and occaſions, contributing to our glory. *Had* Hercules,

ſaid he, *ever been* Hercules, *if that* Lyon, *that* Hydra, *that wilde* Boar, *and all thoſe Monſters, whereof he diſburthen'd the Earth, had not exercis'd his courage? How is it to be imagin'd, he ſhould come to the height he attain'd, if his Virtue had not met with employment? What advantage could we have made of all his ſtrength, all his patience, and all his courage, had he not embrac'd the occaſions of making diſcoveries thereof?* Not that it is to be inferr'd hence, that he would have a man wiſh to ſee whole Provinces peſter'd with Lyons and Hydraes, that he might thereby ſignalize his valour: but he only maintain'd, That the caſuall meeting with theſe Monſters had made a fortunate diſcovery, what kind of perſon *Hercules* was.

Epictetus ſaid further, that *Helvidius* had been admirably well convinc'd of this truth; that he had perfectly ſtudied theſe Maximes, and that never any man had been more indivertible from his Sentiments, then he. When he once thought it his *devoir*, and conceiv'd himſelf oblig'd in Conſcience to do ſomething, though the Emperour, the Senate, and the People ſhould have

have conſpir'd together, and contributed their joynt endeavours, to obſtruct what he was reſolv'd to do; yet was not all that combination of Emperour, Senate, and People able to tempt him to the leaſt act of meanneſs.

It happen'd one day, that *Veſpaſian* was deſirous to get ſomething paſs'd in the Senate. He, well acquainted with the humour of *Helvidius*, and knowing he would be ſure to oppoſe it, forbad him to come that day into the Senate. *Helvidius* having receiv'd that meſſage made the Emperour this return, That it was in his power to deprive him of his charge; but that while he continu'd a Senator, he could not exempt himſelf from doing his duty, and coming to the Senate. Be it ſo, reply'd *Veſpaſian*; I am content you ſhould come thither, conditionally you ſay nothing. If I am not preſs'd to give my vote, anſwers *Helvidius*, I promiſe you to be ſilent. But there is a neceſſity of my requiring your advice, ſaies the Emperour. There is in like manner, replies *Helvidius*, a neceſſity, that I ſhould anſwer

Aut. Diſſ. l. 1. c. 2.

ſwer you, and that I ſhould ſpeak what I conceive juſt and reaſonable. If you do ſo, and that it oppoſe what I would have done, added *Veſpaſian*, I ſhall put you to death. When did I ever tell you, replies *Helvidius*, that I was immortall? you will execute your charge, and I will endeavour to do the like by mine. It may be your part to ſentence me to baniſhment, and it is mine chearfully to ſubmit thereto. It is your part to order my death, and mine, reſolutely and undauntedly to receive it.

I make the leſs difficulty to fall into theſe little Digreſſions, becauſe I obſerve that *Plutarch* is no enemy to the like, and that they are not the meaneſt Ornaments of the Lives which he hath written.

Arr *l.* 1. *c.* 2. *Epictetus* was alſo a great admirer of the Conſtancy expreſs'd by *Agrippinus*. For, ſome one telling him, that an Information, which concern'd his life was put in againſt him in the Senate, he made anſwer, I am glad of it; but what time of the day is it? Being told, it was about five in the After-noon, Come, repli'd he, let us go to the Bath,

Bath, it is time to part. Being return'd home a little while after, news was brought him, that the Information was found againſt him. Well, ſaid he, what am I ſentenc'd to? to Death? No, repli'd he who brought him the tydings, you are only condemn'd to baniſhment. Very well, repli'd *Agrippinus*, let us ſup to night at *Aricia*.

A Town about two Leagues from Rome.

Epictetus had further a particular veneration for *Pyrrho*, the *Sceptick*, upon this account, that he put no difference between *Life* and *Death*. He eſteem'd above all the reply he made to a certain perſon, who thought to make ſome ſport with him. For that man ſaying to him, Why doſt thou not therefore dye, *Pyrrho*, ſince it is indifferent to thee, whether thou liveſt or dieſt? That is the very reaſon of it, repli'd he.

In a word, *Epictetus* would have all Philoſophy to conſiſt in Conſtancy and Continence. Whence he had allwaies theſe words in his mouth, Ἀνέχου καὶ ἀπέχου, *Bear* and *Forbear*, but the grace and energy of the ſaying is much greater in the Greek, than in

any modern Languages. Thence it came, that he was ſo much taken with the procedure of *Lycurgus* towards a *Lacedemonian*, who had ſtruck out one of his Eyes. For the people having deliver'd up the perſon to be puniſh'd; *Lycurgus*, inſtead of revenging himſelf upon him, inſtructed him in Virtue. Wherein when he had made a conſiderable proficiency, he order'd him to be brought upon the Theatre, to the great aſtoniſhment of the People, who thought him dead long before; and ſaid to them, This man, whom you deliver'd up to me as a wicked and perfidious perſon, I now return you vertuous and juſt.

The more we look on *Epictetus*, as an unbyaſs'd eſteemer of mens Actions; the more glorious is it to the memory of theſe great Perſons, to have had ſuch an Approbator as he was. He, all his life, made profeſſion of the *Stoick* Philoſophy; that is, the ſevereſt and moſt auſtere of all Antiquity. Never was there any perſon who knew better how to reduce to practice the Maximes and Precepts of that Sect. For though he may be numbred among the laſt

that

that apply'd themſelves thereto, yet was he one of the greateſt Ornaments of it. In his Diſcourſes and Actions, he imitated *Socrates*, *Zeno*, and *Diogenes*. When he undertook any work, he firſt conſider'd, what they would have done, upon the like occaſion. When he reprov'd, or inſtructed any one, he alwaies entertain'd him with ſome example of thoſe Philoſophers. In fine, he look'd on them as perſons infinitely tranſcending all others.

But, above all, he had a particular eſteem for *Socrates*, and had fram'd himſelf to a ſtile like his. In his Diſcourſes, he us'd compariſons ſo familiar, and ſo pertinent, that he inſenſibly won all to his Opinion. He was ſo perſuaſive, that he forc'd even ſuch as diſputed againſt him, to be witneſſes of the truth he ſpoke. He was no affector of polite or elegant expreſſions; but if his Diſcourſe were intelligible, and full of good ſence, after the example of that of *Socrates*, he was ſatisfy'd. In a word, He had propos'd that Philoſopher to himſelf, as the model, and rule of all his actions.

Though he much eſteem'd *Pyrrho* himſelf, yet had he ſo ſtrange a contempt for the *Pyrrhonians*, that he could not endure them. A certain Pyrrhonian one day taking a great deal of pains to prove, that the Senſes alwaies deceiv'd men, he ſaid to him, *Who of your Self intending to go to the Stoves, miſtook his way, and went to the Mill?* It was alſo an ordinary ſaying with him, *Were I a Servant to ſome of theſe* Pyrrhonians, *I ſhould take a pleaſure in tormenting them. When they ſaid to me*, Epictetus, *poure ſome Oyl into the Bath, I would caſt ſome Brine on their heads. When they call'd for Water-gruell, I would bring them Vineger. And if they complain'd of that uſage, I would tell them their ſenſes were deceiv'd, and would perſwade them that Vineger and Water-gruell was the ſame thing, or I would make them renounce their own ſentiments.*

Arr. *Diſſ.* l. 2. c. 20.

He declar'd himſelf a perpetuall enemy of *Opinion* and *Fortune*, by whom yet others thought the world govern'd. *The greateſt part*, ſaid he, *of thoſe things which we admire are but pure fantaſticall humours.* For inſtance, *The* Iliad, *which is ſo much talk'd of, is it not*

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a pure humour? An humour came into Paris's *head, to carry away* Helene; *she was in a humour to follow him, and* Menelaus *muſt needs be in an humour to be angry at it. And this ſpeaking properly, is the main deſign of the Iliad. But if* Menelaus *had behav'd himſelf like a prudent man, and had imagin'd, that he was no ſmall gainer, by the loſs of ſuch a Wife, what had become of the* Iliad? *Would not it, and the* Odyſſes, *have been clearly loſt.*

As to Fortune, *Epictetus* compar'd her to a Lady of Quality, who proſtitutes her ſelf to Servants, and the meaneſt among ſuch. He ſaid *that the Life, which had any dependence on Fortune, was like a Torrent after a violent ſhower, muddy, foule, hard to be got over, impetuous, and of ſhort continuance.* He maintain'd, on the contrary, *that a minde addicted to Vertue was like an unexhauſted ever-flowing Spring, whoſe waters were clear, ſweet and pleaſant to drink, in a word, not chargeable with any manner of corruption.*

In like manner, it was his higheſt care to heighten himſelf up more and more towards perfection in the ſtudy of vertue. He had renounc'd all other pleaſures,

pleaſures, that he might the more intentively proſecute thoſe of the mind.

Stob. Ser. 1. When he was at any great Feaſt, he minded not ſo much the ſatisfaction of his body, as that of his mind. For it was his perſuaſion, that what was beſtow'd on the body periſh'd, and was never recover'd again; whereas what was beſtow'd on the mind continu'd and was never loſt: For this reaſon did he prefer the Tranquillity and indiſturbance of the Soul, before all other things imaginable. And he held it for a Maxime, That as a man would be loath to be caſt away in a Ship, though it were ever ſo beautiful, and loaden with Treaſures and wealth: ſo how rich and ſumptuous ſoever a Houſe may be, a man ſhould never be ſo careſull in the preſerving of it, as to be cruſh'd by the burthen of exceſſive cares and diſquiets.

Stob. Ser. 38. This was alſo another ſaying of his. *If* Perſia *had been the place of your Nativity, it is certain you would have had no inclination to live in* Greece; *you would only have wiſh'd to live happily in your own Country. When therefore a man is born in Poverty, to what end ſhould he have the ambition*

ambition to be rich? Why does he not rather frame himself to a contentedness in that condition, and endeavour to live happily therein? As it were better for a man never to lye in any but a narrow Bed, and to have his health; then to be sumptuously lodg'd, and to be sick: So ought it to be a mans wish, rather to preserve an undisturb'd tranquillity and composure of mind, in a mean condition, then be tormented with Grief and Vexation, amidst a greater liberality of Fortune. We must not imagine, that our unhappiness proceeds from Poverty, but from Ambition. Nor are we deliver'd from fear, by Wealth, but only by Reason. Whence it comes, that he who makes provision of Reason is content in himself, and charges not his grievances on Poverty. These were the reflections of *Epictetus* on those things whereof men make so great account.

He could not endure those persons, who sought pretences to conceal, or justifie themselves in their miscarriages. He said they imitated the *Roman* Curtezans; who to cover their shame and to justifie their Lewdness, made their advantage of *Plato's* Books of *Common-Wealth*; inasmuch as that Philosopher